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Monday, October 31, 2022

Testing Registry Modification Scenarios

After reading some of the various open reports regarding how malware or threat actors were "using" the Registry, manipulating it to meet their needs, I wanted to take a look and see what the effects or impacts of these actions might "look like" from a dead-box, DFIR perspective, looking solely at the Registry.  I wanted to start with an approach similar to what I've experienced during my time in IR, particularly the early days, before EDR, before things like Sysmon or enabling Process Tracking in the Security Event Log. I thought that would be appropriate, given what appears to be the shear number of organizations with limited visibility into their infrastructures. For those orgs that have deployed Sysmon, the current version (v14.1) has three event IDs (12, 13, and 14) that pertain to the Registry.

The first scenario I looked at was from this Avast write-up on Raspberry Robins's Roshtyak component; in the section titled "Indirect registry writes", the article describes the persistence mechanism of renaming the RunOnce key, adding a value, then re-renaming the key back to "RunOnce", apparently in an effort to avoid rules/filters that look specifically for values being added to the RunOnce key. As most analysts are likely aware, the purpose of the RunOnce key is exactly that...to launch executables once. When the RunOnce key is enumerated, the value is read, deleted, and the executable it pointed to is launched. In the past, I've read about malware executables that are launched from the RunOnce key, and the malware itself, once executed, will re-write a value to that key, essentially allowing the RunOnce key and the malware together to act as if the malware were launched from the Run key.

I wanted to perform this testing from a purely dead-box perspective. Using EDR tools, or relying on the Windows Event Logs. Depending upon your configuration, you could perhaps look to the Sysmon Event Log, or if the system had been rebooted, you could also look to the Microsoft-Windows-Shell-Core%4Operational.evtx Event Log and Events Ripper to percolate unusual executables.

For reference, information on the Registry file format specification can be found here.

Methodology
The first thing I did was use "reg save" to create a backup of the Software hive. I then renamed the RunOnce key, and added a value (i.e., "Calc"), and renamed the key back to "RunOnce", all via RegEdit. I then closed RegEdit and used "reg save" to create a second copy of the Software hive. I then opened RegEdit, deleted the value, and saved a third copy of the Software hive.

During this process, I did not reboot the system; rather, I 'simulated' a reboot of the system by simply deleting the added value from the RunOnce key. Had the system been rebooted, there would likely be an interesting event record (or two) in the Microsoft-Windows-Shell-Core%4Operational.evtx Event Log.

Finally, I created a specific RegRipper plugin to extract explicit information about the key from the hive file.

First Copy - Software
So, again, the first thing I wanted to do was create a baseline; in this case, based on the structure for the key node itself. 

Fig 1: Software hive, first copy output







Using the API available from the Perl Parse::Win32Registry module, I wrote a RegRipper plugin to assist me in this testing. I wanted to get the offset of the key node; that is, the location within the hive file for the node itself. I also wanted to get both the parsed and raw information for the key node. This way, I could not only see the parsed data from within the structure of the key node itself, but I could also see the raw, binary structure, as well.

Second Copy - Software2
After renaming the RunOnce key, adding a value, and re-renaming the key back to "RunOnce", I saved a second copy of the Software hive, and ran the runonce_test.pl plugin to retrieve the information illustrated in figure 2.

Fig 2: Plugin output, second copy, Software hive







We can see between figures 1 and 2 that there are no changes to the offset, the location of the key within the hive file itself. In fact, the only changes we do see are the LastWrite time (which is to be expected), and the number of values, which is now set to 1.

Third Copy - Software3
The third copy of the Software hive is where I had deleted the value that had been added. Again, this was intended to simulate rebooting the system, and did not account for the malware adding a reference to itself back to the RunOnce key once it was launched.

Figure 3 illustrates the output of the plugin run against the third copy of the Software hive.

Fig 3: Plugin output, third copy, Software hive







Again, the offset/location of the key node itself hasn't changed, which is to be expected. Deleting the value changes the number of values to "0", and adjusts the key LastWrite time (which is to be expected). 

I then ran the del.pl plugin (to get deleted keys and values from unallocated space within the hive file) against the third copy of the Software hive, opened the output in Notepad++, searched for "calc", and found the output shown in figure 4 below. I could have used regslack, from Jolanta Thomassen (go here to see Jolanta's thesis from 2008), but simply chose the RegRipper plugin because I was already using RegRipper.

Fig 4: Del.pl output from third copy, Software hive




Unfortunately, value nodes contain neither time stamps, nor a reference back to the original key node (parent key offset) to which they were a member, as described in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 of the Registry file format specification for key nodes; value node structures are described in sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. 

Conclusion
As we can see from this testing, there's not much that we can see just from the Registry hive file that would lead us to believe that anything unusual had happened. While we might have an opportunity to see something of this activity via the transaction logs, that would depend a great deal upon how long after the activity that the incident was discovered, the amount of usage on the system, etc. It appears that the way this specific activity would be discerned would be through a combination of malware RE, EDR, Windows Event Log records, etc.

Next, I'll take a look at at least one of the scenarios presented in this Microsoft blog post.

Addendum, 1 Nov: Maxim Suhanov reached to me about running "yarp-print --deleted" to get a different view of deleted data within the hive, and I found some anomalous results that I simply cannot explain. As a result, I'm going to completely re-run the tests, fully documenting each step, and providing the results again.

Tuesday, October 18, 2022

Data Collection

During IR engagements, like many other analysts, I've seen different means of data exfiltration. During one engagement, the customer stated that they'd "...shut off all of our FTP servers...", but apparently "all" meant something different to them, because the threat actor found an FTP server that hadn't been shut off and used it to first transfer files out of the infrastructure to that server, and then from the server to another location. This approach may have been taken due to the threat actor discovering some modicum of monitoring going on within the infrastructure, and possibly being aware that FTP traffic going to a known IP address would not be flagged as suspicious or malicious.

During another incident, we saw the threat actor archive collected files and move them to an Internet-accessible web server, download the archives from the web server and then delete the archives. In that case, we collected a full image of the system, recovered about a dozen archives from unallocated space, and were able to open them; we'd captured the command line used to archive the files, including the password. As a result, we were able to share with the customer exactly what was taken, and this allowed us to understand a bit more about the threat actor's efforts and movement within the infrastructure.

When I was first writing books, the publisher wanted me to upload manuscripts to their FTP site, and rather than using command line FTP, or a particularly GUI client utility, they provided instructions for me to connect to their FTP site via Windows Explorer. What I learned from that was that the evidence of the connection to the FTP site appeared my shellbags. Very cool. 

Okay, so those are some ways to get data off of a system; what about data collection? What are some different ways that data can be collected?

Clipboard
Earlier this year, Lina blogged about performing clipboard forensics, which is not something I'd really thought about (not since 2008, at least), as it was not something I'd ever really encountered. MITRE does list the clipboard as a data collection technique, and some research revealed that some malware that targets crypto wallets will either get the contents of the clipboard, or replace the contents of the clipboard with their own crypto wallet address. 

Perl has a module for interacting with the Windows clipboard, as do other programming languages, such as Python. This makes it easy to interact with the clipboard, either extracting data from it, or 'pasting' data into it. You can view the contents of the clipboard by hitting "Windows Logo + V" on your keyboard.

Fig 1: Clipboard Settings
But, wait...there's more! More recent versions of Windows allow you to not only enable a clipboard history, maintaining multiple items in your clipboard, but also sync your clipboard across devices! So, if you have a Windows account, you can sync the clipboard contents across multiple devices, which is an interesting means of data exfiltration! 

Both of these settings manifest as Registry values, so they can be queried or even set (by threat actors, if the user hasn't already done so). For example, a threat actor can enable the clipboard history 

Digging into Lina's blog post led me to this ThinkDFIR post on "Clippy history", and just like it says there, once the clipboard history is enabled, the %AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Clipboard folder is created. Much like what the ThinkDFIR post describes, if the user pins an item in their clipboard, additional data is created in the Clipboard folder, including JSON files that contain time stamps, all of which can be used by forensic analysts. The contents of the files themselves that contain the saved data are encrypted, however...there does seem to be (from the ThinkDFIR post comments) a tool available for decrypting and viewing the contents, but I haven't tried it.

Suffice to say that while the system is active, it's possible to have malware running via an autostart location or as a scheduled task, that can retrieve the contents of the clipboard as a data collection technique. Lina pointed out another means of performing clipboard "forensics"; beyond memory analysis, parsing the user's ActivitiesCache.db file may offer some possibilities.

Additional Resources
Cellebrite - Syncing Across Devices - Logging into multiple systems using the same Microsoft ID
ForensicFocus - An Investigator's Goldmine

Fig 2: Printer Properties Dialog
Printers And KeepPrintedJobs
Another means for collecting data to gain insight into an organization is by setting printers to retain copies of print jobs, rather than deleting them once the job is complete. This is a particularly insidious means of data collection, because it's not something admins, analysts, or responders usually check for, as even for some of us who've been in the industry for some time, the general understanding is the print jobs are deleted by default, once they've completed.

We say, "can be used", but has it been? According to MITRE, it has, by a group referred to as "TajMahal". This group has been observed using the Modify Registry technique as a means of data collection, specifically setting the KeepPrintedJobs attribute via the Registry. The printer properties dialog is visible in figure 2, with the KeepPrintedJobs attribute setting highlighted. 

While there isn't a great deal of detail around the Tah Mahal group's activities, Kaspersky mentioned their capability for stealing data in this manner in April 2019. The story was also picked up by Wired.comSecureList and Schneier on Security.

Fig 3: Print Job Files
The spool (.spl) and shadow (.shd) files are retained in the C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS folder, as illustrated in figure 3. The .spl file is an archive, and can be opened in archive tools such as 7-Zip. Within that archive, I found the text of the page I'd printed out (in my test of the functionality) in the file "Documents\1\Pages\1.fpage\[0].piece" within the archive.

I did some quick Googling for an SPL file viewer, more out of interest rather than wanting to actually do so. I found a few references, including an Enscript from OpenText, but nothing I really felt comfortable downloading.

Conclusion
There are more things in heaven and earth, dear reader, than are dreamt of in your philosophy...or your forensics class. As far as data collection goes, there are password stealers like Predator the Thief that try to collect credentials from a wide range of applications, and then there's just straight up grabbing files, including PST files, contents of a user's Downloads folder, etc. But then, there are other ways to collect sensitive data from users, such as from the clipboard, or from files they printed and then deleted...and thought were just...gone. 

Saturday, October 15, 2022

Events Ripper

Not long ago, I made a brief mention of Events Ripper, a proof-of-concept tool I wrote to quickly provide situational awareness and pivot points for analysts who were already on the road to developing a timeline. The idea behind the tool is that artifacts are compound objects, and have value based not just on their time stamps, their value can also be predicated on the analysis questions or goals, or just the nature of their path, or some other factor. 

The tool leverages the fact that analysts are already creating timelines, and uses the intermediate events file format to develop situational awareness and pivot points to facilitate analysis. Many times, we're looking through a timeline for some root cause or predicating event, but we're dealing with the fact that there was some normal system behavior (such as an update) that's caused a large number of events to be generated.

At the moment, the available plugins target Windows Event Log data, in many cases producing output similar to what analysts are used to seeing in ShimCache or AmCache parser output. So, of course, the output of the various plugins are going to depend upon the Windows Event Logs you've included in the timeline, as well as how long it's been since the activity in question occurred (i.e., logs roll over), and what specifically is being audited (although that pertains more to the Security Event Log). Further, they're doing to also depend upon what's being logged, something you can check via the auditpol.exe native utility (or the auditpol.pl RegRipper plugin). For example, I've once saw a Security Event Log with over 35,000 records, and they were all successful logins. Yep, that's it...just successful logins, and because of the nature of the system, most of them were type 3 logins...which is why I wrote a plugin to just get a count of logins by type, so that it's easy to see this information about your data quickly.

That's one of the keys to this tool...to be able to quickly and easily distill and discern some important insight about the data that you have from a system. As such, the real value of this tool comes from analysts using it, exploring it, and asking questions, talking about how to view and manage the data they have. 

Tools like this are especially useful in diverse environments where you are likely to encounter data sources with disparate content, such as consulting environments. During my time in consulting, I never...never...saw two identical environments. Ever organization is different. In fact, it wasn't unusual to find different application loads and audit configurations between departments, or sometimes even within the same department. So when you find something new, you create a plugin to parse it out and provide context, because you never know when you, or another analyst on your team, is going to see it, or something like it, again.

Another key value indicator of this tool is corporate knowledge retention. For example, our team worked an incident were we saw a Windows Defender event with event ID 2051; I'd never seen such an event record before (and haven't since), and no one else had any information about such an event record. So, after researching it, I wrote a plugin, so that what we learned about such an event is now available to every analyst who uses the tool, regardless of whether or not they're on our team. The same is true with respect to the hitman.pl plugin; we saw via the Application Event Log that the customer had had the Sophos HitmanPro product installed at one point (the Windows Event Logs also showed that it had been removed), and that the product had alerted on the file we were interested in, demonstrating that the file existed on the system for some time prior to the incident time frame.

Something else that a few analysts are familiar with is that Application Event Log records can often contain references to malicious software, in DCOM errors, Application Hang event records, and Windows Error Reporting event records. As such, I wrote plugins for each of these event records that lists the impacted applications in a format similar to what's seen in ShimCache or AmCache parser output. 

How To Use It
Here's example output from the ntfs.pl plugin:

D:\erip>erip -f g:\ntfs_events.txt -p ntfs
Launching ntfs v.20221010

Get NTFS volumes

System name: enzo

Mounted Volumes:
C:\ -  WDC WD5000BEKT-75KA9T0
D:\ -  WDC WD5000BEKT-75KA9T0
F:\ - Msft     Virtual Disk
F:\ - WD       My Passport 0741
F:\ - WD       My Passport 25E2
G:\ - SanDisk  Cruzer

Analysis Tip: Microsoft-Windows-Ntfs/145 events provide a list of mounted volumes.

From the above output, we can see that the C:\ and D:\ drives (the system named "enzo" has one hard drive split into two volumes), but we can also see other drive letters listed, along with their associated friendly names. We can likely find similar information in the Registry, and I'd definitely want to include that info, as well, but this is immediate, valuable insight from a limited data source, as I can quickly see drive letter mappings. However, I do need to keep in mind that this information may not be complete, but it's a good start.

Here's example output from the mount.pl plugin:

D:\erip>erip -f g:\vhd_events.txt -p mount
Launching mount v.20221010
Get VHD[X]/ISO files mounted

System name: Stewie

Files mounted (VHD[X], ISO):
D:\test\iso\b91c8f5adb81a262b2b95e2bf85fd7170e100885600af1f9bde322f10ac0e800.iso
D:\test\billid0574.iso
D:\test\iso\test.iso

Analysis Tip: Microsoft-Windows-VHDMP/1 events provide a list of files mounted or "surfaced".

Let's say that you look at the above output and think, "I want to see a timeline of all instances where 'test.iso' was involved"; well, that's easy enough to do, in a few simple steps:

type g:\vhd_events.txt | find "test.iso" > g:\iso_events.txt
parse -f g:\iso_events.txt > g:\tln.txt

Now, you have a timeline of all of the events that include "test.iso".

Interestingly enough, the above output is from one of my own systems, and once I saw it, I checked the values within the RecentDocs/.iso Registry key and found all three of those ISO files listed.

Using the two above plugins, I'm able to get a quick look at drive mappings for devices, as well as mounted ISO files, with minimal effort.

So What?
So, why does any of this matter? Red Canary recently shared some open reporting on Raspberry Robin, where they stated that this malware was spread via infected thumb drives. However, they also stated that there were "several intelligence gaps around this cluster", mentioning one of these gaps. Note that Cisco Talos also reports that Raspberry Robin spreads via "external drives"; however, Cybereason indicates that it could be "removable devices or ISO files". I'm not suggesting that this is a disparity in primary sources, but rather that it's pretty straightforward to gather insight and some solid answers based solely on one or two Windows Event Log files.

Conclusion
Tools like this provide for:

- Creating situational awareness and "pivot points" from your incident data
- Creating context and insights from your incident data
- Corporate knowledge retention, particularly for diverse environments, such as you find with consulting
- An alternate/additional means for analysts of all levels to contribute
- Fully exploiting limited data sets

However, tools like this (and timelines, as well) are limited by:

- Which Windows Event Logs are included
- The applications installed on the system
- The audit policy of the system
- How long it's been since the incident occurred


Wednesday, October 12, 2022

We Need Cybersecurity Mentors

I received a job description from a recruiter recently, along with the request that if I knew anyone who fit the bill and was interested, could I please forward the job description to them. The recruiter was looking for someone at an entry-level, with 1 - 3 yrs of experience, and the listed salary was for a low six-figure salary.

However, the list of Essential Skills were (copy-paste, with a few modifications):

- Practical mobile phone forensic analyst skills on hardware and software.
- Ability to run network and sandbox analysis on Windows, Linux, Mac, Android, iOS, and other platforms.
- Ability to use compliers[sic] and other software analytical tools for different platforms.
- Strong in tools such as <list of tools> and other analysis tools.
- Strong TCP/UDP/IP networking and protocol understanding, how they work, what they do, and what ports they use.
- Strong communication skills to relate findings in an understandable and useful way.
- Strong self-disciplined and self-starter that can think outside of the box and bring fresh insight and experience to the team.
- Comfortable with Linux shell and common GNU utilities.
- Ability to analyze, summarize, visualize, and detect anomalies from raw network communications data in a clear and effective manner.

Yeah, okay. I saw it, too. 

First, "1 - 3 yrs" of experience, entry-level, but "Essential Skills" for the role cover mobile (hardware *and* software), Windows, Linux, Mac, Android, iOS, and "other platforms".

Then, the applicant needs to understand TCP, UDP, IP, and "the ports they use".

Yes, there was a misspelling.

The last thing I'll mention is that, again, this is an entry-level position, but looking to "bring fresh insight and experience to the team". If someone is entry-level, what *experience* are they bringing to the team?

Okay, just to be clear...this is NOT a post to bash the job description...not at all. I'm not interested in calling anyone out, or putting anyone on the spot. All of the above is meant solely to let others know, yes, I'm seeing the same things and having similar thoughts as you are, so you're not alone in that sense.

What this post is to say is that when someone who's entry-level, someone with 1 - 3 yrs of experience in the field sees a job description such as this, they're going to immediately look at it and not apply. "But...why", you ask? Because there's no way you're going to be able to fulfill the stated "essential skills" with under 3 yrs of experience. Even folks looking at this description with a dozen years of experience are going to know that you're not going to be able to attain an "essential" level of all of these skills.

Ultimately, what's going to come of job descriptions such as this will be continued, circular reporting on how there aren't enough skilled people in the industry to fill all of the open positions.

But there is a solution! If' you're new to the cybersecurity field and thinking about looking around for a new role, or if you're looking to get into the field, even as a transitioning veteran...find a mentor. Find someone you trust, someone you can engage with to help you navigate the myriad twists and turns of the maze. Find someone with more experience who can help you navigate job descriptions, certifications, etc., or even just help you figure out which area of "cybersecurity" might be the most interesting to you. 

Finding a mentor can help you get over what might be preventing or dissuading you from applying for the above described role. As an example, my reaction to the job description was to respond to the email, saying, "...I'm sorry, but this makes no sense to me...", and why. I wasn't expecting a response, but I did get one. The recruiter shared that they were most interested in filling an entry-level role, and the message was that the "essential skills" really weren't so "essential". As a result, I'd come back with the message, "yes, go ahead and apply."

So, again...getting into the cybersecurity field can be daunting. Wait...no, I take that back. Not "can be"...is. It is daunting. There are so many options, so many opportunities, and the best way to go about deciphering and unraveling the process of getting into the field is to engage with someone who's already done it. If you're new to the field...a student, a transitioning vet, or if you're transitioning careers...reach out, engage, and find yourself a mentor. 

Monday, October 10, 2022

Post Compilation

For this post, I'll throw out a bunch of little snippets, or "post-lets", covering a variety of DFIR topics rather than one big post that covers one topic.

What's Old Is New Again
During Feb, 2016, Mari published a fascinating blog post regarding the VBAWarnings value. That was a bit more than 6 1/2 yrs ago, which in "Internet time" is several lifetimes. 

Just this past September, Avast shared a write-up of the Roshtyak component of Raspberry Robin, where they described some of the techniques used by this malware, including checking the VBAWarnings value as a means of "detecting" virtual or testing environments.

Getting PCAPs
When I've been asked on-site (or remotely), it's most often been after an incident has happened. However, that doesn't mean that I shouldn't have a means available for myself, or to share with IT admins, to collect pcaps. Having something like this readily available can be very beneficial, when you need it.

It seems that Windows 10 and above comes with a native tool for collecting network traffic data called pktmon.

Prefer Powershell? Doug Metz over at BakerStreetForensics has a solution for you.

I've used bulk_extractor to get pcaps from memory dumps; because this uses a different means for identifying network connections than Volatility, running them both is a really, REALLY good idea! So good, as a matter of fact, that I included an example of this in Investigating Windows Systems, which just shows that regardless of the version of Windows you're dealing with, the process still holds up.

Memory Analysis
Or, if you're looking for a bit more, consider bulk_extractor with record carving.

Also, if you're doing memory analysis, you might consider tools such as MemProcFS and MemProcFS-Analyzer. While I'm not a fan of a lot of the available GUI tools that folks (generally) use for analysis, this tweet from "evild3ad79" makes visualizing processes so much easier!

MOTW
MOTW, or "mark-of-the-web" is a pretty hot topic, as it should be. "MOTW" is the NTFS alternate data stream, or "ADS", attached to files downloaded from the Internet, and something we've seen expand over time. At first these were simply "zone identifier" ADSs, and contained just that...the "zone" for the downloaded file. We first saw these associated with files downloaded via IE and Outlook, and then later saw MOTW attached to files downloaded via other browsers. 

MOTW picked up steam a bit after MS announced that they were going to change the default behavior of systems running macros in Office documents downloaded from the Internet. We then saw some actors move to using archives rather than "weaponized" Office documents, and our attention shifted to archive utilities and MOTW propagation

For a bit of a different perspective on MOTW, Outflank published this article discussing MOTW from a red team perspective.

And, to top it all off, MS has shared information regarding how to disable the functionality (of attaching MOTW). What this does provide is an excellent opportunity for detections, both in the SOC (adding or modifying the SaveZoneInformation value) and for DFIR (checking the value).

Web Shells
Many, many moons ago (circa 2007, 2008), Chris Pogue and I were addressing investigating SQL Injection and web shells for the IBM ISS X-Force ERS team, codifying (or trying to) some basic processes for locating these attacks in a reactive, DFIR mode. We had a lot of different approaches, all of which could be addressed programmatically...things such as the first instance of a page being requested (across the history of the web server logs that you have available), the number of times a page was requested, the length of the request sent to the page, User Agents, etc. Now, all of these depended upon which fields were actually being logged, so we started with the default IIS logging fields and attempted to modify and address things from there. This way, encountering IIS logs with the fields having been modified (hopefully, added to...) or non-IIS web servers were considered "one-offs", and we found that the approach worked well. 

I learned recently that Aaron Shelmire authored a blog on this topic for Anomali; this was a great finding, not just because it lists some of the things we'd looked for, but also because Aaron and I worked together at one point. It's great to see contributions like this within the community.

Events Ripper
Not long ago, I released Events Ripper, a proof-of-concept tool based on RegRipper, in that it relies on plugins to extract and present data. The idea behind Events Ripper is to leverage what analysts are already doing to provide situational awareness and pivot points for analysis. So, when analysts are performing timeline creation (and moving to timeline analysis), they can leverage the events file they've already created to obtain insight into the system.

At this point, all of the Events Ripper plugins are based on data in an events file, from parsed Windows Event Logs (via wevtx.bat). For example, I wrote two plugins recently, mount.pl and ntfs.pl, that analysts can use to verify initial access used by Raspberry Robin; mount.pl runs through the events file looking for Microsoft-Windows-VHDMP/1 events indicating that a disk was "surfaced", and outputs a list of the VHD[X] and/or ISO files. Ntfs.pl looks for Microsoft-Windows-Ntfs/145 events to locate volumes, and map them to the drives or devices. Using these two plugins, you can get some quick insight as to how Raspberry Robin (or other malware) may have originally made it on to the system...via a USB thumb drive or ISO file delivered as an email attachment.

Interestingly enough, when I was developing and testing the mount.pl plugin, the Microsoft-Windows-VHDMP/Operational.evtx log file from my test system contained three ISO files. Checking the RecentDocs/.iso values in the Registry, I found those same three files listed, as well. 

Per a request from my esteemed co-worker Dray, all of the plugins display the system name, or names, as the case may be. It's not unusual for systems to start out as a gold image and be renamed, so you may have event records that still contain the original system name.

Thursday, October 06, 2022

Speaking Engagements

Every now and again, I have a need (re: "opportunity") to compile a list of recorded speaking events. The reasons vary...there's a particular message in one or more of the recordings, or someone wants to see/hear what was said, or it's more about showing examples of my presentation style. For the sake of simplicity, I thought I'd just take the list I'd compiled in Notepad++ and create a blog post.

Huntress TradeCraft Tuesdays
Bang For Your Buck: How Hackers Make Money - Ethan and I discuss various means by which threat actors monetize their activities, which is (in many cases) their ultimate goal. We also present some steps you can take to inhibit or obviate this.

Digital Forensics (or Necromancy) - Jamie and I talk about digital forensics with our special guest, Dr. Brian Carrier

ResponderCon 
Here's a link to my slides; I'll post a link to the recorded talk once it's available.

Update, 7 Nov: They're here! The video for my presentation can be found here.

Podcasts
I recently participated in the Horangi "Ask A CISO" podcast (link here, and on Spotify).

Older Events/Recordings
RVASec 2019 presentation
Nuix Unscripted
A couple of podcasts via OwlTail
Down the Security Rabbithole podcast from 2017
A podcast from 2009
CyberSpeak podcast from 2006 (24 Sept, 1 Apr)

Update, 27 Jan 2023: I appeared on the Future of Cyber Crime podcast with the wonderful Zaira Pirzada as the hostess! Thanks, Zaira, for the opportunity!

Update, 2 Feb 2023: Here's the video for the Future of Cyber Crime podcast.