Flippin' Sweet!!

I found out today that WFA 2/e is available on Amazon for pre-order! Publisher's info here.

Using RegRipper

Ever wonder how to use RegRipper for analysis? After all, the tool pulls data from Registry hive files, and while there is a considerable amount of data reduction, what do you do with the data you get?

Let's look at an example. Say that you've got an issue going on with some systems, and you (a) acquire an image of a system, (b) use FTK Imager to get copies of just the Registry hive files from a live system, or (c) connect to the system via F-Response...at that point, you run RegRipper, or just rip.exe with one of the plugins to extract information from the Services key in the System hive file. If you happen to see Ndisprot listed as a service, you may have found a Trojan.Flush.M infection.

*Note: Trojan.Flush.M is apparently also known as "DNSChanger", and this blog post refers to some excellent resources for checking your network for rogue DHCP servers, including MS's own dhcploc utility.

Also, RegRipper can be used to check for the existence of patches and updates, such as KB958644, which addresses the Server service vulnerability from MS08-067.

Check out the RegRipper.net forums for some new plugins uploaded by Don Weber.

How do you use RegRipper?

Some Good Reading...

I wanted to post some interesting items I've run across and read recently...

Brian Krebs wrote an excellent article that appeared on the cover of Popular Mechanics entitled "When Hackers Attack". Page 2 of the article discusses data trafficking, which is very timely as Brian has also blogged on that topic recently.

Brett Shavers has a PDF document up called Virtual Machine Forensic Analysis, which is another excellent read and full of valuable information whether you're analyzing a virtual machine for intrusion or compromise, or as part of a malware analysis process.

For a wider range of reading, Christina's updated the eEvidence site recently; she's always posted links to some very valuable articles, presentations, and other resources.

Perl Module Updated!

Just in time from Christmas, James MacFarlane has give us some Perly goodness! James has updated Parse::Win32Registry to version 0.41! The update appears to be to get key classnames, and is demonstrated in an additional script that James has provided as part of the distro.

James has done a fantastic job with this module, making so much of what I and others do possible with respect to forensic analysis. For example, just last night, a friend of mine sent me three RegRipper plugins that he's going to be posting on RegRipper.net. While I can't say that RegRipper would not have been possible without James' module, I can definitely say that it wouldn't be in the state its in now without it.

Thanks, James!

RegRipper

RegRipper made the SANS Forensics blog today in a post by John McCash about Windows viewers. Pretty cool stuff! John has deployed RegRipper (actually, rip) in a manner that I hadn't even considered when I wrote it...by launching rip as a viewer via EnCase. Very cool!

How're YOU using RegRipper? Have a plugin you'd like to share? Have a plugin you'd like to see? If you don't feel that your programming skills are up to the job, then all I've ever asked for is a concise description of what you're looking for, and a sample hive file. For stuff like the ShellBags keys or encrypted data, I'll need some formatting or decryption information.

Addendum: Don Weber posted three new RegRipper plugins to the RegRipper.net forums...

Less blogging, more writing

There's likely a noticeable slow-down in posts to this blog, and that will continue, as I'm working on the second edition of Windows Forensic Analysis right now.

2/e is expanding on the first edition by not only updating/adding information to the existing chapters, but also adding two additional chapters; Tying It All Together, as well as one that presents more freely available tools.

2/e should be available around May or June 2009, and thanks, but I already have a tech editor. ;-)

Windows Hibernation files

Matthieu has made his Exploiting Windows Hibernation File presentation available...for anyone interested at all in Windows memory analysis, his presentation is well worth a look. Matthieu is the first person that I'm aware of to come up with a means of exploiting or taking advantage of the hibernation file as a viable source of data, and is a contributor to the Volatility framework. Other presentations and demos can be found here.

Issues with AV

I noticed Hogfly's been blogging lately about issues with AV, here and here. It's some good stuff, and I think bears repeating...AV is NOT a silver bullet, and I think most of us are really very well aware of that.

A while back, I commented about an issue presented by AV company write-ups providing incorrect information; in this case, identifying a Registry entry that was created not directly by the malware itself, but by the shell as a result of how the malware was launched on the system. Given the level of technical ability of many malware analysts, you'd think it would be an easy catch.

Well, I ran across this one at the MS Malware Protection Center Encyclopedia this morning - malware identified as Win32/Autorun.GR, and yet the write up (as of this morning) gives no indication of any sort of autorun capability, via a Registry setting or otherwise. Ag;ain, as of this morning (6 Dec), the description simply states that the malware writes itself to the root of all available drives; however, there's no description or discussion whatsoever of why this malware is referred to as "autorun". Yeah, yeah, I know that the Technical Details state that additional info is pending analysis, but if you're gonna call it "autorun", shouldn't there be a reason for that? After all, if the files are just written to the root of the drive without any other means of initiation, wouldn't that then be something like "Win32/Usersgottaclickme.GR"??

On the other hand, VirusList has a good write up on AutoRun.ah which pretty clearly states where the autorun capability comes from. At least from this write up, you can pretty clearly see the steps you need to take to prevent this malware from affecting your infrastructure.

The more information you can get, the better prepared you can be to address the threat. I know that on the surface, to many, the issue of viruses and malware seems pretty pedestrian, but to be honest, there are a number of organizations out there that get pretty badly hung up by viruses (not even worms) and other similar issues.

Honor Thy Settings

Some of us have been working with the Sality virus lately, which reportedly propagates by writing an autorun.inf file and an executable file to the root of all volumes or drives found on the infected system. If the user workstation maps to a file share, for example, the virus process writes the files to the volume, and anyone else that then connects to that share also gets infected. The same has been shown to be true for removable storage, such as USB thumb or flash drives.

So when working with analysts and customers, most of us tend to recommend disabling autorun capability all together, or perhaps for specific drives. Usually this is good advice, but only if it works. MS recently published this KB article which basically states that previous advice didn't work, and you need to install an update AND set another Registry value (ie, HonorAutorunSetting) for the functionality that you set to actually work.

Is this really such an important issue? Well, given stuff like this, and this...perhaps. Update your systems, and recommend that your friends and customers do the same. Even Symantec has picked this up.

Changing the Face of IR

Major corporations handle our sensitive data...referred to as PII, PHI, PCI. Sometimes, they don't do such a great job of securing and protecting that data. The Dept of Veterans Affairs. TJX. World Bank. IMF. The list goes on. Data breaches happen...there's no question about that. If they didn't, guys and gals like me would be out of jobs.

Historically, the stimulus for change with respect to infosec (particularly with respect to IR) has been external to organizations. An attack or major breach stimulates some change, but its not long lived...once the panic wears off, executive management fails to see ROI from the resources that were suddenly (re: knee-jerk reaction) invested. According to Richard Bejtlich and others, there is no ROI from security...not directly anyway.

Legislation and regulation...with consequences...has a more lasting effect. Visa's PCI defines "compliance", which while not being what most of would consider "security", is at least a step in right direction. There are other regulatory/oversight bodies that provide their own guidelines...NCUA, HIPAA, etc. Section 748.2 of the NCUA Regulations provides guidance on "response programs". The PCI DSS (paragraph 12.9) provides compliance standards for an incident response plan.

Every organization with employees has a payroll process. Why? Well, without it, employees wouldn't get paid, and we all know that the CEO has to get paid, right? And oh, yeah...if you don't pay your employees, they don't come to work...you know where this one is heading. Many organizations have disaster recovery and business continuity plans, backup systems, etc. But why do some organizations not have computer security incident response plans, even when some regulatory body tells them that they need to have one?

Regulatory body definitions of "sensitive data" aside, what about corporations that loose intellectual property (IP)? Did you read this 12 Nov article in USAToday (additional commentary on the story at TaoSecurity)? Many organizations subsist primarily on their IP...remember Ira Winkler's Corporate Espionage?

The Verizon Business Security group put together some interesting statistics in their 2008 Data Breach Investigations Report; for example:

83% of attacks were not "highly difficult" (re: low-hanging fruit)
85% of attacks were opportunistic (re: "hey, look...someone left their keys in their car...")
87% of attacks could have been avoided with reasonable security controls
66% of breaches involved data the victim did not know was on the system

Perhaps one of the most interesting and revealing statistics was that reportedly 75% of breaches were not discovered by the victim. What this means is that data from within those organizations network infrastructure was compromised and exposed, and the breached organization had no idea until someone told them.

So, if its not enough that some regulatory oversight body requires you to have an incident response plan, how about the inevitability of an incident occurring? What's it gonna take for organizations to plan for an incident occurring, rather than reacting (poorly) after one has occurred? Oddly enough, any change in this regard with have nothing whatsoever to do with the victim "doing the right thing", and has everything to do with legislation and regulatory oversight.

IR Preparedness

As a responder, I often hear two reasons for folks calling for help after a breach has occurred (aside from the rather obvious one, that is) - the caller either wants to be sure that they're performing "due diligence", or they're interested in bringing in a disinterested third party to have a look at things.

Every now and then when I get a chance to sit back and reflect, something strikes me. Most often those things were right there in front of me all along, and I just never noticed them. Things like these reasons that people give me.

Take for example the reason of "due diligence". It occurs to me that if someone were really interested in performing due diligence, they would've called me before the incident occurred, to ensure that they were prepared to handle an incident. Closing the barn door and shutting the stall doors after the horse has left is not "due diligence".

What about the "disinterested third party"? If you call a consulting company to come help you contain and recover from an incident, the fact that you're paying them obviates the "disinterested" part of the description, doesn't it?

Many times, folks at an organization looking for assistance after an incident has been detected will say that they want an outside firm to handle the examination in case the issue ends up going to court. But what's the real difference between the victim organization performing the investigation and an outside firm doing so? The outside firm most often has a documented process, or at the very least documents what they did in their report.

The primary reason that consulting companies are called when an incident occurs is that the organization was simply unprepared for an incident. Regardless of legislative or regulatory requirements, they're simply unprepared.

This is not to say that when an incident occurs, you should not call someone for assistance. Rather, I'm reiterating my response from the SANS Forensic Summit panel when Rob Lee asked the panel members about response time to a call...my response was that the best time to call someone for help is before an incident occurs. At the very least, you can protect your organization by demonstrating due diligence.

Costs of not being prepared
Fines - legislative/regulatory oversight often comes with some kind of fine
Notification - writing and mailing letters is going to cost time and money
Charges - 20,000 Visa credit card numbers are exposed...who's going to pay for the cost of reissuing all of those credit cards? You get three guesses, and none of the answers are "Visa" or "the card holder". And two of your guesses don't count.
Suits - Civil suits have been brought against organizations as a result of a breach; just defending yourself is expensive

Something very important to remember about regulatory requirements is that in many cases, unless you're able to definitively identify the data that was exposed, you may have to notify on ALL data that could potentially have been exposed. So, if the database containing 6 million records was compromised, and you were not prepared for an incident, and you think that only 23,000 records were exposed...but you don't know for sure...guess how many people you're going to have to notify? You get three guesses, and the first two don't count.

Benefits of Incident Preparedness
Compliance - with legislative and regulatory requirements
Lower overall cost - the upfront cost of doing nothing is...nothing; in the long run, however, costs mount.
Confidence - from your Board of Directors and the consumer (b/c you're demonstrating "due diligence")

As long as we use IT assets to conduct business, and as long a people are part of the process, there will always be a need for incident response. Incidents are always going to occur, without question. The difference today (and tomorrow) is if you're going to be prepared for an incident...or not.

Yet another way to use RegRipper

The other day, John McCash sent me an email that said the following (posted with permission):

I figured out how to make Encase switch the current working directory for the viewer and like it. The command line "/c cd /d D:\regripper&rip -r [file] -f all&pause", using "C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe" as the application path, works just dandy in the file viewer configuration.

What John's done is launch rip.exe as an EnCase file viewer. Now, I'm not sure why you'd want to use "D:\regripper&rip", and to be honest, I usually don't use file viewers in EnCase, but hey, John, if that works for you, more power to ya! Git 'er done! ;-)

New Code Posted

I posted JT's deleted.zip code to the RegRipper site this morning...go to Downloads, click on RegRipper, and you'll see the zipped archive listed there. The forums are down at the moment so I'll post the simplest usage her...simply unzip the archive into a directory and use the command line:

C:\tools>deleted.pl path_to_hive_file

It's that easy.

Addendum: No, this is NOT a RegRipper plugin...this is JT's code which is completely separate from RegRipper.

Rootkit Detection For Free

During an engagement not long ago, the customer's IT staff had collected bits of the suspect network traffic, and then using the source IP address from the capture, located the system in question and ran "netstat -ano" on the system to prove that the traffic really did originate from that system. Task Manager and tasklist.exe also showed the process with the PID seen in the netstat output.

What does this have to do with rootkits? Well, for one...it proves that they didn't have one! I can't tell you the number of times someone's said to me, "I didn't see anything suspicious, so it must be a rootkit." Yeah, and if I turn my face toward the monitor and close my eyes, and don't see any unusual processes (or anything else for that matter), does that mean that there must be a rootkit on the system?

Well, all I can say is that the simplicity of that finding made it all the more awesome...

More Deleted Keys Goodness!

I was performing some analysis recently, and ran across some real analysis goodness.

First off, I was using my usual tools to parse and analyze Windows Event Logs, and was getting a warning that some of the logs were corrupted. First, the auditpol RegRipper plugin made it clear what was being audited and logged on the system I was analyzing, and then the evtrpt tool was providing me with statistics about the total number of event records, frequency of event IDs and sources, and the date range of all event records. All of this information can give an analyst considerable insight into the content of the Event Logs before I even open them. At that point, I used a modified version of evt2xls to parse the Event Logs into Excel spreadsheet format, and then performed my analysis. Note: EventID.net is an excellent resource to have handy when doing this sort of analysis, and well worth the annual subscription fee.

So, in the Security Event Log on one system, I saw that a user account had been used to create, modify (i.e., add that account to the Local Adminstrators group), and then delete that user account. Of course, the account had been deleted, but I found no other indications that the account had even existed (user profile, etc.), not even in the SAM Registry hive file. So I pulled out JT's code and ran it against the hive file, and presto! There was the deleted key, extracted from unallocated space within the hive file, and I two source of time data with which I could correlate the events.

In another Security Event Log, from another system, I could see where a user account was accessing the Service Control Manager on a system repeatedly, starting and stopping the PSExeSVC service. However, the System hive file from that host showed no indications of the service...until I ran JT's code on it! Again, I had timestamped data from the Event Log that I could then correlate with the LastWrite time from the deleted Registry key.

I have to say that JT did a great job with her code, which she put together as part of her master's thesis from the University of Liverpool. At her request, I will be posting her code to RegRipper.net, and including it in and along with the second edition of Windows Forensic Analysis.

While we're on the subject of the Registry, a good friend of mine contacted me last week with an issue. Apparently, he was working on an examination in which a key factor of the case was determining if and when the user had uninstalled Firefox. According to him, "...install and uninstall dates of programs are of great interest. This will also show destruction of evidence and add additional charges to cases. It also increases sentences sometime by 2x." To help him out, I wrote a plugin that would parse the default browser information from the Registry, but then I compiled the (as-yet-unreleased, still-private, not-even-in-beta) ripxp code, which he used, said that it worked like a champ!

All in all, this is very cool, truly awesome stuff! While this sort of thing doesn't solve every problem, it does add an entirely new capability to the analyst's toolkit, providing answers to new (and in some cases, as yet unasked) questions!

Random Updates

I've been on the road a bit lately, and as such don't really have much info for a single post, but I have a couple of small tidbits that fit nicely when mashed into a single post...

I caught Hogfly's Beware the Key post...in it, he points to this KB article about correcting the "disable Autorun" capability in the Registry. By default, removable storage devices do not (and should not) have autorun capabilities enabled, but preventative measures pushed out via GPOs if necessary are a good thing. Why? Check out this article from India (here from Wired) about an iPod being used to steal data. The usbstor2 plugin for RegRipper was designed just for this type of incident; to help you consolidate data from multiple systems in one place for correlation and analysis. In an infrastructure with dispersed systems, F-Response Enterprise Edition would be extremely useful...I mean, "da bomb-shizzle".

If you do any incident response work at all, you should probably take a look at Didier Stevens' pdf-parser.py Python code. He made this code available from his blog post on analyzing a malicious PDF file. This can be used to narrow down the attack vector for an intrusion or malware on the system.

I've posted about free tools before (here, as well), and one that I wanted to add was a free, open-source AV scanner called MoonAV. If you're looking for other free tools, I'd suggest staying up on the NirSoft Blog, just like Claus. There are a number of very, very useful freeware utilities at NirSoft and more coming soon.

With respect to open-source AV, there are some other interesting, older links over at the OpenAntiVirus project page, as well.

Christine updated the e-Evidence site today! This is the closest thing to a monthly digital forensics e-zine available! Be sure to bookmark this site and check it out regularly.

Bridging the Gap

I work for a large corporation that includes a vulnerability research organization. This organization is responsible for discovering vulnerabilities to operating systems, applications, etc. When they discover a vulnerability and develop a successful exploit, that information goes into the protection mechanisms produced by another part of the company, which are monitored by yet another part of the company. What this ultimately means is that attacks using those techniques are monitored or stopped before the systems themselves are compromised.

So I always think its cool when someone from a monitoring organization reveals some information about an attack that they've seen, such as this post from Symantec. I think its interesting to see this sort of thing, not only to see what an attack "looks like", but also to see if my analysis process includes the ability to find this sort of thing. As an analyst, I've been able to determine that yes, your system was compromised, Mrs. Jones, but when it comes down to it, how would I go about determining how it was compromised? There are a number of browser-borne attacks out there that are possible...how do you narrow down which one was used (if the initial compromise was via the browser?)?

In this particular case, the exploit involves overwriting a file opened by the MS Help and Support Center, so a quick way to check to see if this was the case is to use the following command (either on a live system, or on a system mounted with SmartMount):

C:\>dir /tw windows\pchealth\helpctr\system\sysinfo

Also, point #4 in the blog post states that the MS Help and Support Center Viewer handles "hcp://" links... to see the file association, check the Registry (in the following key) to see that:

HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\HCP\shell\open\command

You should see something like this in the "(Default)" value:

%SystemRoot%\PCHEALTH\HELPCTR\Binaries\HelpCtr.exe -FromHCP -url "%1"

What posts like this allow us to do is to bridge the gap between vulnerability and exploit, and incident response and forensic analysis.

Another such example can be seen at the MS Malware Protection Center, particularly with this post about Win32\Rustock. Looking at the write-up, you're probably wondering how you'd go about using this information...the malware comes in three components, all encrypted, packed with ApLib, and oh, yeah...its polymorphic. Nice! However, as Jesse pointed out in his rootkit paradox paper, these things usually have a persistence mechanism, and in this case, a driver is installed. Even if it's not given the same name, RegRipper can be used to parse through the System hive file using the "services2" plugin, listing the installed services and device drivers, sorted by the key LastWrite times. If you don't want to acquire an image of the system, you can extract the System hive from a running system using FTK Imager, or show how cool you are by using F-Response.

One interesting piece that I pulled out of the write-up was that early versions of the malware apparently "...used alternative streams to store the installer...", but this technique was dropped. What they're referring to here is NTFS alternate data streams. Leave it to the folks at MS to use "polymorphic terminology" (MS has referred to these as "multiple", "alternate", and "alternative", as well as simply called them "data streams") to describe something so simple.

What do you need as a responder?

Many times when working with customers or talking with folks who interface with incident responders (or are incident responders), the topic of what information is pertinent to a responder comes up. When receiving calls from customers, many times the people who make the call and interface with the consultants are not themselves responders (or in some cases, even technical people), and instead represent their company from a business or legal/compliance perspective. This can often lead to misunderstandings due to differing perspectives, which ultimately leads to a lack of (accurate) information. However, this isn't restricted only to non-technical people...sometimes having the sysadmins on the call can lead to the same sort of thing, which is, again, largely due to perspective.

So...what do responders need to know when you call, or what information do your responders need access to?

Well, the first thing that an incident responder is going to need to know is your goals, or what you hope to achieve from the response activities.

In an ideal world, there are four basic sources of technical data that responders will be looking to...network traffic captures, network device log data (ie, firewalls, routers w/ ACLs, etc.), and host-based volatile (memory) and non-volatile (system image) data. There may be instances when all of this information is available, and there may be times when portions of this data is available...however, in many cases, for those unprepared for an incident, very little if any of this is available to a responder. The amount of information available to the responder is going to play a direct role in how completely the responder is going to be able to help you achieve your goals.

I once received a call from someone who needed help with a laptop. Apparently, the laptop had been infected with malware, and the immediate response was to take the laptop off of the network, wipe the hard drive, and install an updated version of the operating system. The caller wanted to know if I could tell them what the malware was, and what (if any) data had been taken. Seriously.

Some questions you're likely to be asked when you call someone to perform incident response include (but are not limited to):

- What type of incident are you experiencing? How would you characterize the incident?
- Do any of the affected systems contain "sensitive data" (per PCI, HIPAA, etc.)?
- How many systems are involved? What are their status? What are their hard drive types, configurations, and capacities (SAN/NAS, RAID 5 with a total of 100GB, mirrored, single 1TB drive, boot-from-SAN)?
- What actions have you taken already (and be honest...running an AV scan and deleting files isn't "nothing")?
- What data have you already collected, if any?
- Do you have a logical network diagram, particularly of the affected systems?

Lots of questions...do you have the answers?

New Tools

Thought I'd take a page from Claus's book and update everyone as to some new tools that are available...

First, over on the Volatility Tumbleblog, there's mention of two new Volatility plugins that Jesse Kornblum developed for use with Volatility. Also on the same blog is a link to a tool to search memory dumps for GMail artifacts. Both look like exceptional utilities.

Speaking of Claus, be sure to check out the updated browser analysis tools over at NirSoft. Claus is also the one who pointed out that AutoRuns has been updated. Thanks! AutoRuns a great tool to use in IR, and to keep up to date on autostart locations.

Brian Carrier updated the TSK tools to v3.0, which includes the Windows versions of the tools. I've updated my own regtime.pl script to produce output similar to that of fls, so that the output of the script can be appended to the output of fls, and parsed with mactime to produce a timeline of file (and now Registry) activity on a system. At this time, only the path and mtime fields are populated for Registry keys, as the LastWrite time is analogous to the last modification times for files. With the currently available tools, deleted keys can be added to the list. I'll need to update the plugins to have RegRipper and rip produce the same output, which would be more targeted (and perhaps more valuable) than dumping all of the keys.

'Zines

For a while now, I've been asking others about what they thought about a forensics/IR magazine...a 'zine (print or electronic) dedicated to IR/CF topics. Most of the responses I've received have been mixed...some good, not many disagreements, but also not a great deal of interest in providing content. Okay, okay...maybe that was too much to ask, but I just have to wonder if there's any interest at all.

Usually the first thing folks say is that the subject is too niche...but have you been to the bookstores lately? There are multiple magazines on tattoos and skin art, antique doll collecting...you name it. If a lot of these subjects/topics aren't "niche", I don't know what topics would be.

Other 'zines that cater to the techie-nerd crowd include Hackin9, Make, (IN)Secure, and Linux Sysadmin Magazine. Even a recent issue of Linux Pro Magazine had a couple of articles aimed at incident response...while not overly technical or "forensic-y", they were useful and an interesting read. Most such articles seem to be aimed at system administrators, with the goal of introducing them to the topic, rather than immediately taking a deep dive into the subject matter.

Content - A 'zine such as this could have all sorts of great content, if some of the emails and blogs I've seen have been any indication. There are folks out there with lots of great ideas. Of course, the "usual suspects" would be included...hardware/software reviews, maybe even book reviews, etc. Sections or articles could be specific to Linux, AS/400, Windows, MacOSX, cellphones/PDAs, etc. The stuff that goes into a 'zine like this could be limitless...challenges, reader emails, ads for conferences and products, new tools or techniques, new versions of software, etc.

Audience - who would this type of media be aimed at? State, local, and federal law enforcement, college (grad/undergrad) students in computer forensics tracks, corporate responders, consultants, even hobbyists. Pretty much anyone who does or is interested in this kind of work, regardless of from which perspective (host- or network-based).

I have no idea what it takes to start something like this from the ground up...and I'm not even going to assume that it's something I can do myself. I would be very interested in contributing...heck, anyway to get CPE points, right?...and trying to get others to contribute, as well. Right now, there is the Digital Investigation Journal, and I would like to be part of attempting to make this a more hands-on journal, and less academic in nature. I have no experience planning something like this, and besides, like most of you, I already have a day job. What I would be interested in doing is perhaps assisting someone who already has the infrastructure available, and working with others to plan out an agenda or content list a year out. One way to go about this might be to email the editor-in-chief of DIJ, expressing an interest in either creating content for the journal, or simply send in your thoughts. Also, I've asked Monika of the Hackin9 staff if this is something that they'd be interested in producing...if you like the idea, and are willing to subscribe or even contribute (dude...CPE points!!!), email her and tell her so!