In case you missed it, the blog post titled, "A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation" was posted to the Dell SecureWorks web site recently. In short, this blog post presented the results of several SecureWorks team members working together and bringing technical expertise to bear in order to run an issue of an unusual persistence mechanism to ground. The specifics of the issue are covered thoroughly in the blog post.
What was found was a novel WMI persistence mechanism that appeared to have been employed to avoid not just detection by those who administered the infected system, but also by forensic analysts. In short, the persistence mechanism used was a variation on what was discussed during a MIRCon 2014 presentation; you'll see what I mean you compare figure 1 from the blog post to slide 45 of the presentation.
After the blog post was published and SecureWorks marketing had tweeted about the blog post, they saw that Matt Graeber had tweeted a request for additional information. The ensuing exchange included Matt providing a command line for parsing embedded text from a binary MOF file:
mofcomp.exe -MOF:recovered.mof -MFL:ms_409.mof -Amendment:MS_409 binarymof.tmp
What this command does is go into the binary MOF file (binarymof.tmp), and attempt to extract the text that it was created from, essentially "decompiling" it, and placing that text into the file "recovered.mof".
It was no accident that Matt was asking about this; here is Matt's BlackHat 2015 paper, and his presentation.
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