I mentioned a concept or idea in my book, but I wanted to follow up on it a bit...I believe to be a theorem. Okay, maybe not a theorem (there's no math involved), so how about a law. Let's call it the First Law of Computer Forensics. Yeah, yeah...that's the ticket! Kind of like "Murphy's Law".
With that being said...here goes:
There is evidence of every action.
Just to be above board on this, credit (or blame, you decide) goes to Jesse Kornblum. One thing to keep in mind about this law is that the evidence is there...it simply may not exist on the media that you're currently examining. For example, one question that I've seen in the lists is, how do you tell from an acquired image of a system if files were copied from it to, say, a thumb drive? Well, you may find the existence of the file on the system, and you will find that the thumb drive was plugged into the system (to see how to determine this on Windows systems, grab a copy of my book), but how do you determine if the file was copied to the thumb drive, if all you have is the image of the system? The fact is...you can't. You need the thumb drive. Even though the evidence you're looking for isn't on the image, it is on the thumb drive.
Now, here's Harlan's Corollary to the First Law of Computer Forensics:
Once you understand what actions or conditions create or modify an artifact, then the absence of that artifact is itself an artifact.
What this is saying is that not only is there evidence of every action, but the lack of that evidence is itself evidence.
Thoughts?
Addendum, 13 May: I wanted to point out that the example I gave of the laptop and the thumb drive is just that...an example. If you're starting to think that I'm making an absolute, definitive statement about the existence of an artifact on the thumb drive, please re-read the statement, and think of it only as an example. Thanks.
The Windows Incident Response Blog is dedicated to the myriad information surrounding and inherent to the topics of IR and digital analysis of Windows systems. This blog provides information in support of my books; "Windows Forensic Analysis" (1st thru 4th editions), "Windows Registry Forensics", as well as the book I co-authored with Cory Altheide, "Digital Forensics with Open Source Tools".
Showing posts with label Kornblum. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kornblum. Show all posts
Saturday, May 12, 2007
Friday, October 06, 2006
d00d, you can do it on Windows, too!
Jesse Kornblum had a couple of interesting posts recently on his blog, both relating to ssdeep. Yes, Jesse, I found the ssdeep stuff to be more interesting than the cat stuff. Sorry! One post was about using ssdeep to discover code re-use by comparing files in directories, and the other one was about using ssdeep to tie a portion of a file to the original. Very cool stuff.
I've gotta say that ssdeep is one of the true innovations in incident response and computer forensics. This isn't a new/different implementation of something that's already there...this is truly something new.
I've gotta say that ssdeep is one of the true innovations in incident response and computer forensics. This isn't a new/different implementation of something that's already there...this is truly something new.
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