Today's post is a mish-mash of tools and techniques that I've seen or used recently...
Hindsight is a great free, open source tool for parsing a user's Chrome browser data. I've used it a number of times to great effect; in one instance, I was able to show that a system became infected with ransomware when the user used Chrome to access their AOL email, where they downloaded and launched the malicious attachment. The tool is very easy to use, and all you need to do is either point it at the user's "Default" folder (within the Chrome path), or extract the sqlite3 files and run it locally against the data.
Joe Gray over at AlienVault published an interesting article on data carving; this has always been an interesting DFIR topic, ranging from file carving to carving for individual records. In the wake of the recent NotPetya attacks, Willi's EVTXtract might come in handy for some. Another tool that I've run against decompressed hibernation files, pagefiles, and unallocated space is bulk_extractor, specifically when looking for indications of network communications. My point is that if you're going to go carving, sometimes it's a good idea to first think about what it is you're carving for, and then seek an suitable approach to performing the carving.
Not "new" by any stretch, but Yogesh's research into Windows8/8.1 search history is still very relevant for a number of reasons. For one, it illustrates the continued use of the LNK file format (which is actually pretty pervasive throughout the Windows platform...), telling us that not all of the stuff we learned from previous versions of Windows needs to be thrown out the door. Second, Yogesh's finding that the retention mechanism for search terms changed between Windows 8 and 8.1 illustrates how quickly things can change on Windows systems. I mean, look at what the Volatility folks have had to deal with! ;-)
I ran across the Network Usage View tool from NIRSoft recently...that's a pretty interesting capability. The write-up for the tool indicates that it gets it's data by reading the SRUDB.DAT database on Win8 and Win10 systems. This is potentially a pretty valuable data source for DFIR work and analysis. In case you haven't seen it, Yogesh has a pretty fascinating presentation available on SRUM Forensics that is worth checking out.
I saw on Twitter recently that there's a Python-based tool available available now for diff'ing Registry hive files. I completely agree with those who've commented that this is some great functionality to have available, and has a great deal of potential...but this functionality has been around from quite some time already, via other sources. For example, James McFarlane's Parse::Win32Registry Perl module distribution includes a script that implements this functionality. Another tool that allows you to diff two Registry hive files is RegShot. I agree that this is great functionality to have available, particularly if you want to see what differences exist between a hive file extracted from a VSC or found in the RegBack folder, with one in the config folder.
Speaking of the Registry, I saw this paper from DFRWS 2008 that discusses recovering deleted data from Registry hive files. My first real encounter with this sort of information was via Jolanta Thomassen's dissertation paper on the topic, and the regslack tool she provided to go along with it. Since then, other tools (RegRipper plugins del.pl and del_tln.pl) have implemented similar functionality, largely due to the demonstrated value of this functionality.
Jason Hale posted a while back (2 yrs) on the DeviceContainers key on Windows systems, and I ran across his post again recently. What he found is pretty interesting...I'll have to dig into it a bit more and see what else is available out there. Jason's research seems to provide a pretty good idea of what can be derived from the key data, so this may be well worth developing a RegRipper plugin, even if just to research what's available in various hives.
I was working on some analysis recently, and was facing an issue where a good number of NTUSER.DAT files had been recovered from an image, all of which had been extracted from the image and placed in folder paths. While there were a lot of these files, I was only interested in one Registry key (pertinent to the case), a key for which a RegRipper plugin did not exist. So, I modified an existing plugin to give me information about the key in question, if it did exist, and then wrote a DOS batch file to iterate through all of the folders, running the new plugin (via rip.exe) against the hive file. A few minutes of development and testing, and I had a repeatable, documented process in place and functioning, providing a capability that had not been in my hands just a few moments before. My point in sharing this is to illustrate what can be achieved through simple problem definition, and the use of open sources to develop a solution. I have the batch file I used, so it's pretty much self-documenting, and I pasted the command line from the batch file into my case notes.
pundup - Python script from herrcore to extract contents of McAfee *.bup files. Even in 2017, there are a great deal of systems (and infrastructures) without any real endpoint monitoring capability employed, and sometimes you need to dig around a bit to get some really useful information about an incident. One place you can look is AV detections (via the logs), and as such, any available quarantined files may provide even greater insight into the incident. Further, if the system is running an older version of Windows, and you don't have an Amcache.hve file collecting process execution artifacts (like SHA-1 hashes), having the actual EXE itself to document, hash, and analyze would be very beneficial.
AppCompatProcessor - I ran across this little open source gem recently (note: according to the readme, this does not currently run on Windows); this tool runs through either AppCompatCache or AmCache data and allows you to...well, do a LOT with the data. It's well worth a look; just reading through the main page, I can easily see that a lot of what I include in my own workflow is used as pivot points, and then to expand the data. For example, I tend to look for things like "$Recycle",
SysMon View - this is a really interesting approach to filtering and visualizing data collected by Sysmon on a Windows system. Unfortunately, the only time I see Sysmon in use is on my own test systems; it does not seem to have been widely adopted by members of the corporate community who call for IR assistance. I do think that this is a great approach to making better use of the data, though.
LimaCharlie - from refractionPOINT, described as an open source, cross-platform endpoint sensor. There isn't a great deal of information available via the web page, but there are a few tweets available.
Speaking of endpoint agents, SANS recently conducted a product review of CrowdStrike's Falcon platform...you can get the PDF report here.
Invoke-Phant0m - The description states that the script "walks thread stacks of Event Log Service process (spesific[sic] svchost.exe) and identify Event Log Threads to kill Event Log Service Threads. So the system will not be able to collect logs and at the same time the Event Log Service will appear to be running." Given the recent release of tools that claim to be able to remove individual Windows Event Log records, this is an interesting approach. However, the biggest issue with the released tools is the inability to validate findings; while some on Twitter (I've been pointed to tweets) have claimed success, the actual EXE and process used haven't been shared to the point of allowing others to validate the findings. To say, "...just start with this DLL..." does not provide a means of validation.
Of course, if you're not able to remove individual records, Inslainity provided another approach, albeit one that can be validated. I've tested another approach to removing specific ranges of event records from the Security Event Log, using a method that can be scaled to all logs, but is much more insidious if you don't.
The folks at Javelin Networks have come up with an in-memory PowerShell script that can peek into consoles and provide detailed information about what's being done. The description states that the script "extracted the content of the following command-line shells: PowerShell, CMD, Python, Wscript, MySQL Client, and some custom shells such as Mimikatz console. In some cases, the tools might be helpful to extract encrypted shells like the one used in PowerShell Empire Agent."
Adam (Hexacorn) has published yet another article demonstrating means of persistence and EDR bypass. If nothing else, this is an excellent example of why endpoints of all versions (not just Windows) need to be instrumented to monitor and record process creation events, including full command lines.
Pete James over at Precision Discovery have a fascinating blog post in which he discusses records left behind in an often-overlooked Windows Event Log file. I can't say that I've ever had a case where I've needed to know which Office files had been accessed by a user, but if you're tracking such artifact categories, then this is a good one to include.
Speaking of Office products, Will Knowles at MWRLabs published a blog post on using Office add-ins for persistence.
Here are a couple of links I've had sitting around for a while that I really haven't dug into...
Javelin Networks - CLI Powershell
NViso - Hunting Malware with Metadata
FireEye - Shim Databases used for Persistence