Krzysztof shared another blog post recently, this one that addresses the battery use and the battery level of a system, and how it applies to an investigation.
At first thought, I'm sure a lot of you are asking, "wait...what?", but think about it for a moment. Given the pandemic, a lot of folks are working remote...a LOT. There are a number of firms that are international, with offices in a lot of different countries all over the world, and a great many of those folks are working remotely. Yes, we've always had remote workers and folks working outside of office environments, but the past 2+ years have seen something of a forced explosion in remote workers.
Those remote workers are using laptops.
And it's likely that they're not always connected to a power supply; that is, there will be times when the systems are running on batteries. As such, Krz's blog post is a significant leap forward in the validation of program execution. After all, Krz points out one particular artifact in his blog post, describing it as "one of the few artifact providing process termination." (emphasis added)
So, why does this matter? Well, a couple of years ago (okay, more than "a couple") I was working a PCI forensic examination for an organization ("merchant") that had been hit with credit card theft. In examining the back office server (where all of the credit card purchases were processed), we found that there was indeed credit card theft malware on the system. We found the original installation date, which was a key component of the examination; this is because one of the dashboard items we had to complete on the report (Visa, then the place holder for the as-yet-unformed PCI Council, had very structured requirements for reports) was the "window of compromise"...how long was it from the original infection until the theft of data was halted. So, again, we saw the original installation date of the malware in late November of that year, but two days later, we could see that an "on demand" AV scan detected and quarantined the malware. Then, a bit more than 6 weeks later, the malware was again placed on the system, and this time we tracked repeated AV scans that did not detect this new malware.
We made absolutely sure to clearly note this in the "window of compromise". Why? Because most merchants have a pretty good idea of the numbers of credit cards processed throughout the year, particularly during different seasons (spring break, other holidays, etc.). We were able to clearly demonstrate that during the Thanksgiving and Christmas holiday seasons, the malware was, in fact, not installed and running on the system. This means that during "Black Friday", as well as the run-up to Christmas, the malware was not stealing credit card numbers from this merchant. We needed to make absolutely sure that this was understood, so that when any action was taken or fines were levied against the merchant, this fact was taken into account.
This is just one example of why we need to validate program execution. Krz's blog post clearly demonstrates yet another. Over the past 2+ years, there's been an explosion of remote work, one that has persisted. Employee systems clearly serve as an entry point into organizations, and as Krz pointed out, many threat actors opt to use Scheduled Tasks as their persistence mechanism.
As Krz pointed out, the Task Scheduler UI has options for setting these conditions; however, the LOLBin schtasks.exe does not provide command line options for enabling or disabling the condition. So, by default, when schtasks.exe is used to create a scheduled task, these conditions are going to be set as Krz shared, by default.
As Krz pointed out, there are some ways to change this; for example, if the threat actor has access via the UI (logged in via RDP, or any other remote desktop capability) they can open the Task Scheduler and make the change. Another way is to use the schtasks.exe command line option to create the scheduled task from an XML file. Or, perhaps you can use Powershell, if it gives you greater control of the conditions of the scheduled task.
From a threat hunting perspective, look for either the use of schtasks.exe with the "/xml" command line option, or for alternate means of creating scheduled tasks that allow for modification of the conditions. For example, Powershell's Set-ScheduledJobOption module includes options such as "-RequireNetwork" and "-StartIfOnBattery".
From a DFIR perspective, analysts can either scan all scheduled task XML files for those set to not stop running when the system goes to batteries, or simply open the XML file for the suspicious task and view it manually. Anytime analysts see the Task Scheduler UI being opened (observed during DFIR analysis), they might want to consider taking a closer look at any changes to tasks that may have occurred.
Something else to consider during DFIR analysis, particularly when it comes to malware persisting as a schedule task, is the idle state of the system. I'll just leave that right there, because it applies directly to what Krz described in his blog post, and impacts the validation of program execution in a very similar manner.