The Windows Incident Response Blog is dedicated to the myriad information surrounding and inherent to the topics of IR and digital analysis of Windows systems. This blog provides information in support of my books; "Windows Forensic Analysis" (1st thru 4th editions), "Windows Registry Forensics", as well as the book I co-authored with Cory Altheide, "Digital Forensics with Open Source Tools".
Monday, November 09, 2009
More Linky Goodness, plus
As a side note, I'll be presenting at the WFO-ECTF meeting later this month, on Registry and timeline analysis.
Check out Claus's blog post on spilled COFEE. Claus also has an very good post full of links to useful tools...I know this is kind of circular, me linking to Claus's set of links (in this post by Claus, they come back to this blog...), but Claus's set is comprehensive enough, why bother retyping all that? Claus has always had some excellent links to portable apps, particularly AV tools that can make IR a bit easier, and in his most recent blog points out some remote desktop tools that IT admins may find useful, as well as Wireshark for Windows 7!
Brett and Ovie have got a couple of new CyberSpeak podcasts up...the 7 Nov podcast not only has a news story where a system infected with a keystroke logger led to the conviction of the suspect, but there's also an interview with Matt Shannon of F-Response.
Speaking of Matt, you have GOT to check out his latest press release about TACTICAL and the CyberSpeak podcast! Regarding TACTICAL, this is what Matt has about it on his site:
F-Response TACTICAL is the newest F-Response software product. TACTICAL has been uniquely designed to streamline live analysis, collection, and authentication. TACTICAL is built around the best of the F-Response Field Kit and Consultant edition, it was designed from the bottom up to be easier to use, faster, smaller, and more efficient.
TACTICAL uses a unique dual dongle/storage device solution that allows an investigator to bring their favorite tools to bear on Windows, Apple, and Linux targets.
This sounds very cool! Check out Matt's excellent CyberSpeak interview for more information! I cannot wait to see TACTICAL in action...
The 1 Nov CyberSpeak podcast has an interesting discussion on data breach notification...check it out.
Hey, anyone remember Clippy? If you do, check out the version of Clippy for VIM...
I ran into an interesting issue recently that I thought I'd bring up here. I've been doing some analysis, and as part of that analysis, I've been using regslack to get deleted keys and unallocated space from Registry hive files. When I find a deleted key, there's a LastWrite time associated with it, but sometimes I see Registry keys in the unallocated space of the hive files. What this means is that the key found in unallocated space no longer meets the conditions for or definition of a "deleted key" (more on that later). However, in the hex found in unallocated space, I can clearly see the FILETIME data for the key's LastWrite time, and that's something I might like to translate into something usable. So let's say I see the FILETIME data:
be 31 72 dc d4 94 c9 01
Using Perl, I can run that through a conversion routine and get something a bit more usable:
Sun Feb 22 10:03:50 2009
Pretty simple. Pretty cool.
Speaking of FILETIME objects, its a brave new forensics world, folks! Windows Registry keys have FILETIME LastWrite times, and some values contain FILETIME "objects" within their binary data. Others contain *nix epoch (32-bit) timestamps. Still others contain 128-bit representations of date/time stamps - this format is also found in Scheduled Task .job files. I was parsing some Symantec AV logs recently, and it turns out that they have their own format for date/time stamps! Interesting stuff...and there's SO much more!
Wednesday, November 04, 2009
Link-alicious
ImagineLan has an SRP Explorer utility that looks quite interesting, allowing you do to do diffs of Registry hives across Restore Points. Interesting.
From the MMPC, a post regarding the MSRT October release, with a case study.
Rifiuti, the tool from FoundStone for parsing Recycle Bin INFO2 files, has a version available for Vista Recycle Bins called rifiuti2. This is actually a rewrite of the original code, according to the Google Code page. And yes, there is a version available for Windows.
Anyone caught the most recent edition of Captain Forensics??
Addendum: Chris Novak had an excellent (albeit short) article published on the Fundamental Failures With IR Plans...essentially, not having/testing one. Chris makes an excellent point...although war stories are sexy (re: fascinating) and writing is boring, the fact is, you have to have an IR plan. I was talking to someone recently about a company that stores CVV data, and does their own PCI self-assessment...and passes. I bet they also check "yes" when they get to the PCI DSS requirement 12.9...
I found some interesting stuff on Ophacki recently, starting with this analysis from Joe Stewart, and then moving on to the ISC write-up. Folks, if nothing else, this sort of thing demonstrates the lengths malware authors can and will go to in order to keep their stuff on systems. This bit of malware is a link hijacker, which essentially means that it's relatively harmless...however, more and more customers are asking folks like me (and the malware experts I work with) to determine if the malware has the capability to steal data, and if so, what did it take. First, this ties in to the IR plan article...if you have no plan and do nothing but shut the system off (i.e., capture no volatile or network traffic data), my ability to help you answer those questions is limited. Your IT staff are closest to the incident...it may take me 24-48 hrs to get there, depending on flights (and contract negotiations). If you have a plan and trained response staff, you can at least collect the data...
Second, if you haven't hugged your malware analyst today, do it now. I mean, seriously...look at how complex Ophacki is...it reportedly hides in memory by destroying the PE header. It doesn't decrypt the strings it needs in memory until it needs them, and then it deletes them when it's done. It also deletes the SafeBoot key, and reportedly hooks the APIs to delete Registry keys so that you can't delete the keys it uses for persistence. It also removes Zeus.
In short, there is a lot of sophistication for a simple link hijacker...which tells me that there's some kind of economy at work here...someone REALLY wants to make money!! What if the intent were different? What if the author really wanted to steal data? What if the malware was used to determine the type of system it was on...if a home user's system, look for indications of web-based purchases (or just sniff the keyboard), look for tax returns, and then turn the system into a zombie.
My point is that malware is getting more and more sophisticated, and malware authors are responding not only to standard business practices (i.e., Conficker spread via network shares) but also to some of the response procedures - some malware does not write to disk, but instead remains persistent in memory because the systems are rarely rebooted. Some folks recommend simply nuking the box from orbit...clean and reinstall...but malware authors know that the box will likely be put right back in place with the same holes and vulnerabilities, because that part of the re-installation plan is very often missed or skipped, because there is no IR plan.
Tuesday, November 03, 2009
The Future of RegRipper
As an example, I have a test script for the new version of RegRipper working...working fairly well, actually. Here's an example of the output:
C:\Perl\forensics\rr3>test.pl d:\cases\xp\config
Software d:\cases\xp\config\Software
Sam d:\cases\xp\config\Sam
Security d:\cases\xp\config\Security
System d:\cases\xp\config\System
ProductName = Microsoft Windows XP
CSDVersion = Service Pack 1
CurrrentVersion = 5.1
S-1-5-21-1220945662-884357618-682003330-1004
%SystemDrive%\Documents and Settings\Caster Troy
So, I provided the example output so that you could see what's happening, but there are still some things that are happening under the hood. In this example, I've pointed the test script to a directory where I have the Registry hives (SAM, Security, Software, and System) extracted from a sample image (one of Lance Mueller's practicals)...so the script locates the files with the right names, and then checks to see of they're the right type of hive file - that's the first list in the output. Then the script accesses the Software hive file (because now we know that it's a Software hive file) and extracts information about the OS, as well as about user profiles that the Registry knows about.
So know we have a pretty good opportunity for a great deal of automation, don't we? So, I can mount an acquired image via SmartMount, ImDisk, or P2 Explorer (or my app of choice), or access a remote drive via F-Response, or mount a Volume Shadow Copy, and then just point RR at the system32/config directory. Point and shoot...very cool. Now the application has a good deal of information on which to make decisions and choices to control program flow...such as, if the system isn't Windows 2000 or XP, is there any sense in running the ACMru plugin against the user hives? Or, if the system is XP, I may want to run one plugin to get wireless SSIDs, but if the system is Vista or above, I may want to run another plugin.
So, you're looking at the future of RegRipper...well, you're not so much as I am! ;-) For those of you who've already seen the power of RegRipper, and for those of you who've said that using RegRipper reduced what used to take you days into minutes, there's a lot to look forward to!
Speaking of plugins, I wrote another one tonight...svcdll.pl. This one runs through the Services subkeys in the ControlSet marked "Current", and locates all services with a ServiceDll value...many times, these are services run via SvcHost. This is also used by some malware variants...they'll create a service with a random name, and the ServiceDll value will point to a similarly oddly-named DLL. Svcdll.pl gives you a quick look for such things, providing a modicum of malware detection, and hey...it can be run against live systems if you're using F-Response!
Monday, November 02, 2009
Into The Boxes
Sound cool? Check out the Welcome Message. If you'd like to contribute, check out the Collaboration Box. Comments and suggestions can be sent using the Call Box. Complaints and whining will be piped to /dev/null. ;-)
Tuesday, October 27, 2009
Linkware
Thanks to JL, we should be looking for a new release of Volatility soon! JL's been doing a lot of great work documenting Volatility, as well.
A bunch of us will be at the NetWitness User Conference next week...I won't be speaking, but I will be there with my employer. This is a great product, and if you don't already know about it, you really should check it out. Richard Bejtlich of TaoSecurity fame, perhaps the predominant NSM luminary, has blogged about NetWitness, albeit not recently. Maybe there's something on the horizon...we can only hope!
TrueCrypt 6.3 is out, with full support for Windows 7 and MacOSX 10.6 Snow Leopard! If you're one of those folks who loves the MacBook hardware, and loves to have the ability to use both MacOSX and Windows (via BootCamp), then you now have the ability to protect sensitive (ie, customer) data on both platforms.
Hey, did you know that this guy has been collecting screenshots from TweetMyPC? Looking at the archive, all of the screenshots are from this past summer (June through August), but still...probably a little more revealing than I'd like to have folks see! Reminds me of the site that used to be up a couple of years ago called "seewhatyoushare.com"...
Christa Miller had an excellent article posted on Officer.com, regarding crime scene evidence that's being ignored. While specific to LE, my own experience tells me that this is also the case with IR activities, where first responders don't often recognize the value in certain devices or data. Also important in today's day and age, Christa raises the issue of evidence "in the cloud". I'd blogged about 4 1/2 years ago about GMail Drive artifacts, and it's good to see Christa bringing this sort of thing back into focus again.
There are some thought provoking posts over on the Cassandra Security site...give them a look and a read, leave your comments. At least one of the guys over there is a former Marine, like myself, and this guy...so that's a recipe for some interesting posts!
The Free Tools post is really taking off...if you've got something to add, please feel free to make a comment. Really. Just add a comment if you have a free tool for Windows systems that isn't already on the list.
File Extensions and Programs
File extensions are the basis of traditional file signature analysis, where the file signature (usually a "magic number" within the first 20 bytes of the file) is compared to a set of known file extensions associated with that particular type of file. When a match is found, nothing happens...that's to be expected. However, when there's a mismatch...either a new file extension, or a new file extension and "magic number" combination...there should be a flag of some kind to notify the analyst.
I blogged on file associations over a year ago...sometimes circling back around to the older stuff is a good thing, can be very useful, and can remind us of things that might not have been useful at the time. So, the next time you run across an odd file extension, try taking a look at the Registry within the image; perform a little Registry analysis and post your findings to the list, rather than posting a question...because folks are just going to be asking you, "what did you find through Registry analysis?"
Friday, October 23, 2009
Free Tools
Regardless, I thought that this would be a good way to start and even maintain a list of free tools (or at least some that have trials/demos available) that can/have been used during computer forensic examinations on Windows systems. I'll start by providing tools that I use, as well as links to other tools, and from there, I will expand the list as I receive information (ie, comments, emails, etc.)
General Tools
Perl - 'nuff said; mostly for creating my own tools
Strings/BinText
LiveView
Acquisition
FTK Imager - great for opening raw (ie, dd) images, .EOx files, .vmdk files, etc - even allows you to "acquire" other formats to raw/dd. Also great for selected file extraction from the image, when you don't need everything
dd - George M. Garner Jr's FAU
dcfldd - another CLI imaging tool, available for the Windows platform
Tableau TIM - coming Q4, 2009
Raptor - bootable Linux CD that can be used for imaging (this will likely open up a whole flurry of similar emails, so let's just use this one as a placeholder for all bootable Linux CDs...)
Image Mounting
IMDisk - great free tool for mounting Windows images on Windows systems, in read-only mode
VDKWin - another free tool
P2Explorer - from Paraben; free, requires registration
Image Analysis
TSK Tools - I've used mmls and fls mostly, but blkls is extremely useful, as well
ProDiscover, Basic Edition - Not a full suite, but very useful
AntiVirus Scanners (ClamWinPortable, SysClean, Malwarebytes)
Timeline Creation Tools (TSK tools, pasco, Perl scripts, etc.) - Perl scripts available from the Win4n6 Yahoo Group
Internet Evidence Finder (JADSoftware) - also, check out the Encrypted Disk Detector
Carving - foremost, scalpel, PhotoRec
DiskDigger - from Dmitry Brant; also check out NTFSWalker
File/Document Metadata
Structured Storage Extractor - view contents of structured storage/OLE files; this used to mean just MS Office (pre-2007) documents, but on Windows 7, this now means Sticky Notes, etc.
OffVis (fact sheet) -
Office 2007 document metadata (script) - look for cat_open_xml.pl; other tools available, as well
Skype Extractor -
PDF Tools - from Didier Stevens; some of Didier's tools have been incorporated into the VirusTotal site
MSI files - InstEd
Working with Email
Email Conversion Tools - may not be free
AvTech - Perl script
Emailchemy - from Weird Kid Software; demo available
Mail-Cure - free, described here
Aid4Mail - free trial available
Intella - from Vound Software; doesn't require that Outlook be installed; trial available
File Hashing
MD5Deep - also allows for other hashing algorithms
SSDeep - fuzzy hashing; is also incorporated into VirusTotal
Registry Analysis
RegRipper - includes rip, ripXP, and regslack
MiTeC Registry File Viewer
Didier Stevens' UserAssist
Pwdump7 or SAMInside - great way to get password hashes for cracking
Archive/Compression Utilities
IZArc
PeaZip
Other utilities
ExtractNow
Memory Collection/Analysis
Windd - 1.3, for x86 and x64 now available
MDD - ManTech's memory imaging tool; 32-bit, has the 4GB limit
Nigilant32 - from Matt Shannon, F-Response; Windows 2000/XP only
Volatility - XP SP 2&3 only
Memoryze - from Mandiant
Packet Analysis
NetworkMiner
WireShark
NetWitness Investigator
Tools for extracting files from streams - not all of the tools listed run on Windows
Browser Analysis
SQLite Spy (for Firefox 3 analysis)
Misc
U3 Launcher Log parser
Other Mandiant Tools (Highlighter, Web Historian, etc.)
MIR-ROR - read about it here; great tool from Russ McRee (read Russ's ISSA toolsmith write-ups on other tools)
ShadowExplorer (Dan Mares' VSS)
SMPlayer - "for troublesome videos"
Evidence Mover
Windows Search Index Extractor - Extract information in the Windows Desktop Search database (ie, windows.edb file)
Sites
Various thumbnail cache extractor applications can be found here.
NirSoft has a variety of free and useful utilities available.
RedWolf Computer Forensics - various parsing tools
VirusTotal
Any you'd like to add? Comment, or email me.
Addendum:
Prefetch Parser
Fox Analysis - browser analysis
MiTeC Windows Registry Recovery
MiTeC Windows Registry Analyzer (associated guide)
DigestIT 2004 MD5 Hash
Wednesday, October 21, 2009
Windows 7 and the Future of Forensic Analysis
Okay, so I was in Redmond, WA, last week at some computer conferences (yes, plural) and was on-stage with Troy Larson while he waxed philosophic on forensicy stuff with respect to Windows Vista and beyond, including Windows 7. I've been noodling a lot of this over, and here's what I've come up with...One of Troy's pet projects is Volume Shadow Copies (please, do not ask me about any of his other interests...), and I have to say, he's really one of the most knowledgeable folks I'm aware of on the subject of VSC and the needs of forensic analysts. Troy has some interesting things to say about how Volume Shadow Copies can be accessed, but one of the most interesting aspects is that one way to do this is by booting your acquired image via something like LiveView. Another means is to mount the image file as a drive letter from a like system. At that point, you can image the entire volume or dump only selected files.
Notice at no point did I say, "...insert your dongle...", or "...run this EnScript...". It turns out that Volume Shadow Copies can be enumerated and accessed via WMI, meaning that once you have an image mounted, you may be able to (haven't tried it yet) automatically process what you need.
I was doing some research into processing the new Windows Event Log format (new as of Vista and Windows 2008, that is...) for inclusion into timeline analysis, and what I've been able to find out is that if you extract the pertinent .evtx files from your acquired image, you may be able to process them via LogParser, but again...on a like system. Andreas Schuster did a great job in documenting the format, but .evtx files are a combination of binary, and binary XML...eesh! Note - you may need to consider using something like wevtxutil in your live response activities...
Okay, I'm not sayin' that commercial forensic analysis suites are no longer useful...after all, ProDiscover 6.0 allows you to access Volume Shadow Copies if you're accessing the remote system live via the servlet...which means that if you're using PD for live response, you can likely automate what you need via Perl-based ProScripts.
So where does that leave us? Folks, I'm gonna sound the ol' "the age of Nintendo forensics is over " trumpet yet again, and the dawn of the educated, knowledgeable, sofis...soffis...
Tuesday, October 20, 2009
Timeline Creation Tools
pref.pl - removed the path to the directory where the Prefetch files are kept; the feedback had an excellent point - don't want to confuse the user
evtparse.pl - updated this script to (a) dump the sequence of event records and time generated timestamps, and (b) get all .evt files in a directory, rather than requiring the user to enter one command line for each file
jobparse.pl - created this one recently, for parsing Scheduled Task .job files (NOT the schedlgu.txt log file); includes output in TLN format
Now, these updated tools have NOT been included in the toolset available in the group, largely because my second Hakin9 article - the one where I provide a hands-on walk-through of the tools - should be coming out in the near future, and I don't want to confuse anyone. Also, the feedback (which I greatly appreciate) pointed out that this is still largely a manual process, and I realize that this can be an impediment to a lot of forensic examiners. Maybe what needs to happen is that I need to provide training on using these tools, so that more folks can realize for themselves the real power in this analysis technique.
Another thing I really need to emphasize about timeline generation is how powerful it can be when used to optimize triage and analysis techniques. Let's say you have a large-ish incident that you're responding to, and it's clear that you need to have a means to get some analysis completed in parallel, while the rest of the data is being collected. On-site staff can collect file system metadata and specific files from acquired images while verifying the image file systems, and ship that data off to another analyst for timeline generation and analysis. Given an image of 80 or 160GB, getting the file system metadata, and archiving selected files that have been extracted from an image means that you're sending off several MB of data, rather than GB. In addition, you're not actually sending file contents...so in the case of response activities involving a data breach, you can get analysis done by shipping this data off, but you're not sending the actual sensitive data itself...file names and paths != file contents.
So consider this scenario...on-site staff are in the process of acquiring systems (or, perhaps the organization's own incident responders are acquiring memory dumps and images) and part of that process is to verify the acquired images by opening the image file in FTK Imager. Now, you may only have a few team members on-staff, all trying to collect a considerable amount of data; not just images, but also network diagrams, data flows, etc. So, their new process is to verify the file system of each image, and then run the appropriate tools to collect file system metadata, as well as various files (i.e., .evt, .pf, .job, Registry, etc.), zip them up, and ship them off for analysis. Put these in the hands of someone skilled and practiced in the use of the timeline creation tools, and you will very quickly get a timeline of activity from each system. This can help you quickly narrow down what you're looking for or at, as well as help you scope other systems that may be involved in the incident. And you haven't contributed to the exposure of sensitive data!
Friday, October 16, 2009
Challenges
Book news and Registry research
DCC2009 Takeaways
One of my biggest takeaways from this event was the fact that the needs of CIOs, IT staffs and consultants (which is where I spend most of my time) are, on the surface, vastly different from the needs of law enforcement. "Victim" IT organizations are primarily concerned with getting rid of a malware infection, regardless of what it is...worm, Trojan, etc. In my experience, eradication and returning the infrastructure to normal operations are the primary concern, with compliance and questions about data loss/exfiltration usually popping up after the fact (i.e., too late).
However, LE is interested in intelligence, some sort of actionable data that can be used to investigate cyber crimes, track down the players and prosecute someone, preferably someone fairly high up the food chain.
At first glance, there may not be an obvious overlap. However, both sides have information available that is useful, even valuable, to the other. LE might have data available about cyber crimes that occur across a wide range of victims...such as, was the incident initiated by a browser drive-by, was it targeted, etc? LE (depending upon the level that we're talking) may have trending information available regarding victim types, intruder/criminal activity, etc. Victim IT organizations will have information available about malware variants, outbound connections (to command-and-control servers, etc.), sensitive information collected, etc.
Where things tend to break down is that in some cases, LE either doesn't track the kind of information that might be useful to victims, or they feel that they can't share it because doing so might expose information. Victim IT organizations many times feel the same way...that they can't share what information they have without exposing information about their infrastructure, intellectual property, or "secret sauce". Sometimes, the victim organizations do not want to contact LE for fear that their name would be included in public documents, exposing the fact that and the means by which they were compromised...something those organizations do NOT want made public.
Another takeaway I got from the conference is that there is a definite organization and structure behind cyber criminal activities. There's a hierarchy to the structure, an economic driver (i.e., money), and individuals in the communities are kicked out if they fail to provide something back to the community. These seem to be driven like businesses without an HR department...maybe there are certain elements to this structure that the good guys could emulate.
Taking this anywhere is going to take some thought and some work.
Saturday, October 10, 2009
Links
Some of the TrustWave guys were at SecTor this past week...check out Chris's write-up on the event. Chris's presentations, and others, can be found here.
An astute reader found that the Kindle edition of WFA 2/e is now available. Thanks, Tom!
Matt Shannon posted recently on New Directions in Electronic Evidence Collection, regarding a conference he's attending at the University of Florida.
If you need to get specific information, such as product keys, from a Windows installation, check out KeyFinder from Magical Jelly Bean Software. Hey, it even has command line options so you can include it in your live response batch files!
If you haven't done so in a while, check out the e-Evidence site...the most recent update appears to be about 22 Sept, and Christina has linked some really interesting files, like this one and this one. There are even a couple of papers on forensics involving social networks (here, and here).
Wednesday, October 07, 2009
Hakin9 articles
Something that's very interesting (and validating) about this edition is Ismael Valenzuela's "My ERP got hacked - An introduction to computer forensics, pt II" article. Not only does Ismael make use of RegRipper, but he also walks through some techniques for parsing data (i.e., Event Logs/.evt files, IE browser history/index.dat file, etc.) in forensic analysis...very cool stuff, indeed! While Ismael's article does not explicitly develop a timeline, there are some data collection and analysis techniques illustrated in the article that are pretty spot on and very useful.
The second article in the series (I'm told that it will be in the next edition) is a hands-on walk-through, using a freely available image file that can be downloaded from the Internet as a basis for actually creating a timeline. While this is still a very manual process, I firmly believe the benefits of this technique far outweigh the "costs" (i.e., having to extract files and run CLI tools, etc.).
The third and final article (which I'm working on now) is a wrap-up, showing some alternative and advanced techniques that have proven (for me, anyway) to be extremely useful in getting data to include in the timeline. I've also pointed out a couple of areas where we need coverage with respect to converting the retrieved data into something that we can include in a timeline.
Overall, I think that the biggest issue with timeline creation and analysis at this point is the sheer volume of data that's available, and how we can go about doing a bit of data reduction. For example, I have yet to find a suitable technique for data visualization on the front end, when you have all of this data to go through. Clustered dots showing various activity (i.e., file system, Event Log, etc.) don't particularly make a great deal of sense to me, largely due to the fact that things such as software updates and normal operating system activity tend to create a great deal of "noise", where as, the compromise or the malware activity falls into what Pete Silberman of Mandiant referred to as "least frequency of occurrence". So spitting things out in ASCII format so that the analyst can do...well...analysis seems, to me, to be the most effective way to go at this point.
Once the analyst has nailed down the events in question, essentially separating the wheat from the chaff, then is the time for visualization techniques, particularly for reporting. I've seen and referred to some techniques for doing this, including Simile and using Excel to generate something usable.
Sunday, September 27, 2009
Where was Waldo?
So basically, here's how it works....during the course of an exam, you may determine that the system was used to connect to multiple wireless access points (WAPs). As discussed earlier, there may be more than just the SSID of the WAP recorded in the Registry...for example, the MAC address of the WAP is also recorded. Pretty neat.
So what? So you have a MAC address...what would you do with this information? Look up the vendor? Well...that's a start, as it can help you confirm that you do, in fact, have the right type of device. But in a few easy steps, you may be able to find out where that WAP is physically located. I put heavy emphasis on may because this isn't a 100% done deal...but it is way kewl nonetheless.
So the steps go a little something like this...
1. Run RegRipper (or rip or even ripXP) against the Software hive to get the SSID and MAC address of the WAP, as well as the last time the WAP was connected to. For XP systems, the updated ssid plugin is what you want to use, and for Vista and above systems, I wrote a plugin called networklist.
Note: There's a date associated with the SSID within the binary data of the Registry value on XP systems...however, I have no idea what this date means. On Vista systems and above, the MAC address has a distinct value (ie, does not need to be stripped out of a binary data stream), and a date/time stamp that indicates when the WAP was last connected to.
As an example, here's the data I retrieved from an XP system:
Launching ssid v.20090807
SSID
Microsoft\WZCSVC\Parameters\Interfaces
NIC: 11a/b/g Wireless LAN Mini PCI Express Adapter
Key LastWrite: Thu Feb 7 10:38:43 2008 UTC
Wed Oct 3 16:44:25 2007 tmobile MAC: 00-19-07-5B-36-92
For completeness sake, the output of the networklist plugin looks like this:
Launching networklist v.20090811
Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\NetworkList\Profiles
linksys
Key LastWrite : Mon Feb 18 16:02:48 2008 UTC
DateLastConnected: Mon Feb 18 11:02:48 2008
DateCreated : Sat Feb 16 12:02:15 2008
DefaultGatewayMac: 00-0F-66-58-41-ED
2. Submit your MAC address to the SkyHook WiFi Geolocation database...for metropolitan areas, you may get a lat/long pair back...it's not guaranteed, of course.
C:\Perl>skyhook.pl 00-19-07-5B-36-92
Latitude = 38.9454029
Longitude = -77.4444937
Note: The code for skyhook.pl was based on this code...many thanks to Joshua! I'm doing this on Windows, and I couldn't find a version of XML::LibXML that installed on Windows, so I used XML::Simple. Also, I made a number of other modifications with respect to programming style, but Joshua did most of the heavy lifting.
3. Using the lat/long pair, create a URL for Google Maps (you can include some additional information, such as the SSID and date last connected), which will give you a map with a pushpin and any additional information you add. For multiple WAPs and to plot multiple pushpins on the same map, you may need to create a KML or KMZ file and host it someplace that can be reached by Google Maps, and then submit the appropriate URL (on the KML Update page, hover over the link that ends in cropcircles.kmz...).
For the WAP in our example, the URL might look like this. Here's an article that describes how WiFi geolocation can be used to recover stolen laptops.
Again, this isn't 100%. Not every area is mapped, and its highly unlikely that SOHO WAPs have been mapped. Still, if you can get something out of this, it might be useful.
Resources
Google Gears Geolocation API gets Wifi
SkyHook Wireless How It Works page
Firefox GeoLocation add-on
Addendum: Updated my Perl script tonight, thanks to input from Colin Shepard on Net::MAC::Vendor (for Windows, download the .tar.gz file, can extract the .pm file into site\lib\Net\MAC in your Perl install...). Now, the script takes either a WAP MAC address (if no SSID is provided, uses "Unknown") or the path to a file containing MAC addresses and SSIDs on single lines, separated by semi-colons. The output is any vendor and address information returned by the OUI lookup, and a URL that can be pasted into your browser window to get a Google Map (if lat/longs are available). For example:
C:\Perl>maclookup.pl -w 00:19:07:5B:36:92 -s tmobile
OUI lookup for 00:19:07:5B:36:92...
Cisco Systems
80 West Tasman Dr.
SJ-M/1
San Jose CA 95134
UNITED STATES
Google Map URL (paste into browser):
http://maps.google.com/maps?q=38.9454029,+-77.4444937+%28tmobile%29&iwloc=A&hl=en
Pretty sweet...
Friday, September 25, 2009
Linkity-Link
Here's a link to a recent DFI article that describes what a report should contain.
Not long ago, John H. Sawyer wrote a nice article for DarkReading that mentioned my name...very cool, and a very nice reference. Thanks, John!
From the sausage factory, there's a great blog post about Windows Photo Gallery artifacts. IMHO, for the most part, we don't see enough of these kinds of posts...great work! Here's another, similar post from the ThinkTankForensics blog.
This past week, I had an opportunity to be around and talk to some really smart people, and had some really interesting thoughts about WiFi geolocation data extracted from acquired images. Okay, it's not quite as simple as that, per se, but I do think that for some folks (in particular, law enforcement), this sort of data exploitation will be extremely useful.
Ran across a reference to the Digital Forensic Framework last week, and thought I'd take a look...yes, Virginia, there is a Windows version! I'll have to read a bit more about it and give it a run.
Speaking of frameworks, ProDiscover version 6 is available! Thanks to Chris Brown's generosity, I've been using PD since version 3, and have written several ProScripts, which is the Perl scripting interface into ProDiscover. Some of the updates in version 6 are very, very welcome, including the ability to conduct regular expression raw mode searches. Very cool! I also ran across some comments in various lists that version 6 also supports access to Vista Volume Shadow Copy files...this is something I definitely need to check out. One of the things I've always loved about ProDiscover is the cleaner interface than some other tools, and I really like the Perl scripting capability!
Wednesday, September 16, 2009
Parsing .job Files
Based on John's article, I wrote a Perl script that parses the binary structure of the .job file header, and also gets some of the variable data that follows the header. For right now, I've got a number of the header fields translated and extracted, and I've been testing against a couple of .job files I've created on my own system; the output appears as follows:
C:\Perl\forensics>jobparse.pl d:\cases\apple.job
Command : :C:\Program Files\Apple Software Update\SoftwareUpdate.exe -task
Status : Task is disabled
Last Run Date: Thu Jul 16 16:21:00 2009 Exit Code : 0x0
So, this is a good start. I've had engagements where analysis of the Scheduled Tasks log file proved to be critical, so I can see how being able to get details from the .job file might also be important. Also, as John pointed out, information about the binary structure of .job files may assist you if you find indications of deleted .job files in unallocated space. If you get a hit and are able to backtrack a bit, you may find enough information in unallocated space to be able to decipher the header fields.
As a side note, I did find some minor issues with how the MS documentation identifies some of the fields in the structures; for example, the documentation shows a total of 9 2-byte fields for the UUID, but UUIDs are defined as being 128-bits long (ie, 8 bytes); this threw my initial parsing code off by 2 bytes. Interestingly enough, this applies to Windows XP systems, and the last run time for the job is maintained in the header as a 128-bit wide field; here I was thinking that the new date format was only part of Vista and Windows 7! Eesh!
Addendum: Interesting thought...the timestamps (and other data) embedded in .job files are updated when the task is run; therefore, this information can be used to provide indications of activity that modifies file MAC times, such as AV scanning, searches, or AF tactics...
Thursday, September 10, 2009
Mo' Stuff
Perhaps one of the biggest things to come through my inbox lately has been that F-Response now has a scripting interface! That's right! According to Matt:
The F-Response Enterprise installation package now includes a partial implementation of the F-Response Enterprise Management Console in a language neutral fully scriptable COM object. This object will allow a technical user of F-Response Enterprise to script actions typically initiated manually in the FEMC.
Sweet! What this technical jargon amounts to is that F-Response EE can now be scripted through Perl! Imagine automating collection of system names from the network, pushing out F-Response EE, collecting information, disconnecting and moving on to the next system!
Here's an analysis tip that I picked up based on a question posted to one of the forums...when posting a question about time stamp oddities (in particular) on Windows systems, it helps to specify which version of Windows you're working with. For example, if you have a last modified date that is three days after the last accessed date on a file, and the system is Vista, then you may have encountered an artifact that has to do with the fact that by default, Vista does not update last access times on files. If the system is XP or Win2K3, you may want to check the NtfsDisableLastAccessUpdate value. Even variations within the same version of Windows (XP Professional vs. Home) can be important...and yes, you can use RegRipper to get this information for you.
Lee posted an excellent write-up regarding issues of MSOffice document metadata, along with an interesting example that many of us have likely run across. This is an issue that's been around for some time, and even though MS's updated the application itself, this is still something that can be very important during an examination, as Chris found out recently.
Are you tired of using RegRipper? Mark Woan has created RegExtract, which according to Mark, is based completely on RegRipper, and implements most of the plugins that are currently publicly available (I currently have 118, a few of which are proof-of-concept and for testing purposes only...) with RegRipper. I downloaded and installed RegExtract and took a look at it. It requires .NET 3.5, and it only runs on Windows (unless you can get .NET 3.5 installed on wine), but if you need a better looking UI and perhaps slightly faster processing, you should take a look at this. A couple of things I found with RegExtract is that while it can run all plugins designed for the NTUSER.DAT hive (or any other hive type) against that hive file, it doesn't appear to be able to automagically determine the hive type, or allow you to run only specific plugins in a predetermined order against the hive file. The results of the plugins are sent to a text field in the UI, and the user doesn't appear to have the ability...at least not obviously...to save the results to a file, for inclusion in a report (directly into the report, or an appendix). You can, however, select what you want from the text field, copy it to the Clipboard, and then paste it into a report or text file.
Finally, something else to consider...the plugins are compiled DLLs, and are not open. RegRipper's plugins are essentially text files that can be opened in Notepad or an editor of your choice (much like Nessus's plugins), so if you ever have any questions about what the plugin does or why it doesn't work, you can just open the plugin up and have a look-see.
Speaking of RegRipper, Rob posted the results of his updated research on USB devices to the SANS Forensic blog yesterday. This is an excellent bit of work that Rob's done and really taken the original work that Cory and I did oh, lo those many years ago to new levels. Drop by and check out the handouts Rob's put together. Based on an IM exchange with Rob, I've updated mountdev.pl a bit to pull out the sector offset information for the partitions, so that there's less confusion when you see two volumes or drive letters with the same disk signature or MBR disk identity (they're the same thing...the 4 bytes found at offset 0x01B8). The plugin now returns the same information seen when you open the image in FTK Imager and look at the start sector for the partition. With this new information, I need to clean up the plugin a bit to make the output a bit easier to understand.
Finally, Matthieu's been busy, it seems, working away on win32dd (now referred to as "windd") and looking for beta testers (ignore the "2008" in the changelog info...it's 2009). Take a look!
Wednesday, September 09, 2009
Thoughts on Tool Verification
First off, I'm a proponent of verification, but I also think that we, as a community and a profession, shouldn't be blindly running on autopilot when it comes to tool verification. Specifically, what is "tool verification"?
One way to look at this is that you'd like to verify that a tool does what it's supposed to do correctly. For example, if one tool (ie, AccessData's FTK Imager) generates an MD5 hash of an acquired image, you might want to verify that the algorithm used to generate that hash was done implemented correctly, so you'd use another tool (one that you trust as being correct...perhaps Jesse Kornblum's md5deep) to confirm that the MD5 hash is, indeed, correctly implemented. The implication here is that if both tools produce the same output, then the implementation employed by FTK Imager is correct and verified.
A similar way to look at this is with respect to a tool such as RegRipper, but how would you verify the results? For one, what other tools do what RegRipper does...besides RegExtract, which is, according to the author, based on RegRipper?
Well, similar to Nessus, RegRipper implements its actions based on plugins that are text-based. So if you want to determine what a plugin does (ie, what keys, values or data it extracts, and how it extracts or parses that data), all you need to do is open the plugin in Notepad or an editor. I know that a lot of folks will look at the Perl code and slip in to a coma, but for the most part, the data extraction and parsing logic is right there...in some cases, it's easy to see: read the binary data into a variable/Perl scalar, go to this offset within the data, read this many bytes, and translate it based on this table of values. Easy.
If you're not sure that what a plugin does is correct, I try to make sure that I include either descriptions in the comments of the plugin (lines that start with "#") or references to credible sources about the structure or use of the key, value, or data being parsed. In most cases, much like WFA 2/e, these references consist of MS KB articles. If there's some question about the data and how it is or should be interpreted...well, that's what I provide the references for, and as many of you know, I've tried to answer more than a few questions along those lines.
So, how do you verify what a tool like RegRipper does? One way is to use another tool that does what RegRipper does...but outside of RegExtract, there are no other tools that do what RegRipper does. You can open the hive file in a Registry viewer...some of the plugins present information in a manner similar to the way a viewer would, and you can always write your own plugins to do this. But what about parsing/interpreting binary data? Or "decrypting" ROT-13 value names? At that point, the only way to verify what RegRipper does is to sit down with the hive file open in a hex editor and do it all by hand.
Again, I'm not saying that tool verification isn't important...because it is. But so is understanding what a tool does. Blindly saying that I need a tool verify my findings against another tool is really pointless unless I understand what both tools do, and how they do it. I mean, the same holds true in other areas, such as live response. If I run two tools that both use to the same API calls to show me the active process list or the network connections, have I verified anything? No, I haven't. However, if I run two tools that use disparate APIs (and don't converge until somewhere very low in the API stack) then I have verified the tools and the findings...but only to the point where they ultimately converge somewhere down the API stack.
So, before discussing tool verification, we need to have an understand of the purpose and use of the tool, as well as an understanding of how the tool functions.
Tuesday, September 08, 2009
RegRipper Wishlist
So...please, comment here, or email me. Thanks!
Tools for mounting images
When would you need to use such tools? I like to use tools such as these as in most cases, you can do your analysis whilst goin' commando (sans dongle, as it were), and in many cases, do a great deal more deep analysis than you could using one of the commercial forensic analysis suites. In most cases, it's as simple as mounting the image and using your tools, many of which are CLI and can be run via a batch file. Mounting the image gives you access to most (be cognizant of permissions issues) of the files in the file system without that system being live and without requiring a password to log into the system (as with LiveView), simply because you're not actually booting the system, you're just reading the file structure.
I won't got into any particular detail about these tools, as I want to simply provide them here as a means of identifying those that are available.
VDKWin (free) - Excellent UI for VDK.
ImDisk (free) - installs as a Control Panel applet
SMARTMount (pay) - Andy Rosen's superb mounting utility; requires a dongle, mounts raw, SMART, EWF, SAW, VMWare virtual disk format images, and detects a wide variety of file systems.
P2Explorer (free, requires registration) - Lots of cool features, mounts a variety of formats.
Captain Nemo (pay) - Mounts raw and RAID Reconstructor images from Linux, MS, and Novell systems.
Other similar tools that may be of use:
MKS Software's mount utility
MS's Virtual CD-ROM drive from XP (1, 2, 3)
Mounting ISO images on Vista/Win7
WinCDEmu - mount ISO images
For those of you doing live response, the guys over at CommandLineKungFu posted a great blog on determining information about mounted drives and shares. Some of the tools I've written and provided on the DVD that accompanies WFA 2/e implements similar functionality as the wmic commands that Ed posted, but in most cases going just a bit further.
Stuff
Richard Bejtlich posted his review of WFA 2/e on Amazon...thanks, RB! It's validating to see luminaries in the security industry picking up, reading, and commenting on books like mine, particularly because Richard is so well known for NSM, something my book doesn't really cover.
Thanks to a recent comment to one of my blog posts, I was led to the Eating Security blog...always nice to get different perspectives on topics. I like some of the recent posts about IR teams and documentation, as well as the "does it make sense" test. I've done considerable work over the years with respect to CSIRP development and IR team testing, and I like to see how others approach the problem. While each customer brings a unique perspective to the problem through their own infrastructure and team organization, it's always interesting to see the thoughts that others have...most often due to the fact that developing a new IR team with a customer doesn't allow for a great deal of feedback beyond, "wow...okay...this is new."
Speaking of CSIRP development, here's an interesting blog post that I picked up a while back. Interesting how information on "crisis management" so easily maps to a CSIRP.
The guys over at cmdLabs had a nice post on SQLite for forensics nerds that has some good information...something to read, maybe play around with a bit, and bookmark.
Claus had an excellent forensic roundup post recently...he really can cover a LOT of stuff. I'm still sifting through this one. Claus and I read each other's blogs pretty regularly, so you see not only crosslinks but comments, as well...but Claus never ceases to amaze me with the breadth of useful information he's able to come up with. He's got a couple of links for pcap visualization that I need to take a look at.
All in all, not a bad catch this time around.
Addendum: Just a bit later, I ran across a couple of interesting blogs, and rather than wait to post another blog entry, I thought I'd add them here...
ForensicInnovations had an interesting blog, and the post that initially got my attention was Push for Live Forensics. I started into the post expecting yet another argument for developing a live response process, and got some of that...but the post ends with an announcement for a data profiler product that appears to provide a list of various file types found on the system. I'm not entirely sure how I'd use such a product, as rather than "show me all of the file types" I might take the approach of just "show me all graphics images", or something a bit more directed (based on the goals of my response).
I also found Simple Techniques that Fool Forensics Tools in the archive, as well as a couple of other posts. There's mention of NTFS Alternate Data Streams in this post, something I've been writing about for years, and oddly enough, is still something that is an effective hiding place for data, as many sysadmins and forensic analysts still do not understand how ADSs are used by the OS, let alone by the bad guys.
Also, I found a link to this CyberCrime blog that has some interesting stuff to read.
RegRipper used to validate Neeris infection...with lots of other good stuff in the post, as well...a good deal of which I use in creating timelines for analysis...
Wednesday, September 02, 2009
More Links
Seems the folks at SpiderLabs will be putting on a Malware Freakshow presentation at a conference in Toronto coming up soon. Also, it sounds as if the presentation is going to be pretty interesting...take a look at this excerpt from the DarkReading article:
In a memory-dumping attack, the attacker reads the unencrypted transaction or other information that sits in memory before it goes to the actual application. The hotel attack included several pieces of malware, including code that dumps the contents of the memory onto the attacker's machine, and another that performs data parsing. "One piece installs itself as a service so the malware can come back when it needs to boot up," Ilyas says.
I'd run into the same malware myself during an exam, and one of our team members had seen an earlier version a year so prior to that. This shows how pervasive this stuff can get! In the instances I'm aware of, the intruder gained access to the internal network and then gained domain admin access...most often due to weak passwords...and then targeted very specific systems, and installed the software mentioned in the article.
Also, if you're going to the conference, be sure to check out Chris Pogue's Sniper Forensics presentation.
On the topic of visualization, check out the VizSec2009 conference. This looks really interesting, as visualizing malware program flow, for example, can be extremely helpful. One of the things I've been struggling with is to understand how to graphically represent timeline data so that an analyst can use that to determine what happened and when; however, there's just potentially so much data that I've been having a very difficult time trying to come up with some way to represent what happened. Right now, its a manual process to sift through the data looking for the smoking gun(s), and representing the findings can be done with a table or an Excel spreadsheet.
It looks like I'll be attending HackerHalted in Miami later this month, and Syngress is not only a sponsor but will have books available. I'll try to be available to sign books...if I'm not at the booth, just grab me (beer's always welcome!!).
And finally, for the VMI alumni in the readership, I picked up follower number 89 today!
Monday, August 31, 2009
What is "Registry Analysis"??
For most folks, this phrase probably conjures memories opening a hive file in their favorite Registry viewer (RegEdit, EnCase, ProDiscover, or RFV, etc.) and looking at a couple of the more popular entries, such as the "ubiquitous Run key". Others may run though an entire list or spreadsheet worth of Registry keys and values. Manually. By hand. How boring. And if you're a corporate consultant, there's no better way to waste a customer's money as you burn through the hours on this chore, calling it Registry analysis.
But is this really analysis? Is analysis simply viewing data, or is it extracting data and interpreting that data in not only its own context , but also in context with other data?
One of the things I've stated in my books as well as in this blog is that when interpreting data (particularly data extracted from the Registry) its vital that the analyst understand what created or modified (with deletion being the extreme form of modification) a particular artifact, so that the nature and context of that artifact is understood (and presented/explained). For example, what would lead to a graphics image file being referenced in the MRU list to an image viewing application? The artifact is there, but what lead to its creation? Depending upon how that particular MRU list is maintained by the application, you may have a very specific timestamp associated with the artifact, as well...one that may correlate with the last access time of the file. Ah, but there's another point about Registry analysis, analysis in general, and understanding the context of artifacts...beginning with Vista, MS disabled the updating of last access times on files by default, so now analysts can't correlate a file's last access time to other artifacts.
So my point is that Registry analysis isn't just about viewing certain keys and data...no, that's Registry viewing. Rather, Registry analysis is about interpreting Registry artifacts (keys, LastWrite times, values, and data) in the context of the actions that led to their creation and modification, as well as in the context of other artifacts. Tools such as RegRipper strive to assist analysts and examiners with this sort of analysis, by providing a framework for extraction, correlation, a modicum of interpretation, as well as the presentation of the data with some supporting information.
Growth and research in this area appears to be sought after by the community, but is also limited by a lack of support and contributions from the community.
Timeline Analysis
Registry data can be an integral part of a timeline created for analysis; however, there is much more timestamped data available in the Registry than just key LastWrite times...sort of like that quote from Hamlet. For example, on Windows XP, some data holds the SSIDs that the user connected the system to via wireless networking, as well as the WAP MAC addresses and when the connection was made. On Vista, you also get the first and last time that SSID was connected to (as well as the WAP MAC address). Let's not forget other keys and values, such as MRU listings and one of my personal favorites, the UserAssist subkeys. These aren't the only differences between Windows versions...and I'm sure that there are others out there who are working on documenting these differences besides myself.
Links and Stuff (Registry research)
Thanks to the SANS ISC blog, I ran across an AV product (free) called Immunet. This seems very interesting as it takes a "cloud" approach to protection...I know that "cloud" is becoming something of a buzzword in the computing industry, but maybe this will bring it home for the older folks; it take a SETI@Home approach to protection. How's that? The concept (not talking about the actual implementation) sounds pretty cool...
I ran across a tool called TrojanHunter recently that looks pretty interesting from a live system response perspective. The main page for TrojanHunter is absolutely correct...there are Trojans and other malware that don't necessarily hide on the system as much as they are DLLs injected into the memory of other processes. Therefore, when you're doing your live response, you're going to see network connections for some processes that may not normally have network connections...because it's the Trojan that's doing it.
Lately, I've been working on some Registry research, and I came across this page at the MS site, which includes the following:
Executable binary code should never be stored in the registry.
Pretty cool, eh? That's why I wrote the findexes.pl plugin for the RegRipper...Don had written on his blog not long ago about malware that wrote executable files into binary Registry values, so there had to be a way to detect this sort of thing.
As part of this Registry research I was doing, I was digging into the Shell\BagMRU data, as I had read this excellent paper on the use of the keys, but noticed that the paper didn't include anything about the binary data itself. I contacted the authors of the paper and Mr. Zhu was kind enough to respond with some information that proved to be very helpful. I took it from there and wrote up a RegRipper plugin to parse the information...several actually, that provide the information in various formats. Right now, however, it's very bare bones and the data needs to be formatted a bit (no, I take that back...a LOT) better.
Also during that research, I found something interesting...actually, a couple of somethings. First, the MUICache key on Vista has moved to the other user hive file, %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat. On a Vista system, I found the key in the UsrClass.dat file, in this path: Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\MuiCache.
The other interesting thing I found was that some of the Shell\BagMRU key appeared to be in the normal location in the NTUSER.DAT file, but there was additional information in the UsrClass.dat file, as well, in the path, Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRU. In fact, some of the information in the UsrClass.dat file seemed to be more inclusive...but that's just in my initial testing.
While we're on the topic of the Registry, its completely clear to me that the Windows Registry maintains a great deal of data, and as has been the case with memory analysis, things also seem to change as the versions of Windows change. With Vista and Windows 7, not only has a great deal of the information we would normally expect to look for on an XP system moved, but new data associated with wireless networking (specifically, binary values for wireless profiles named DateCreated and DateLastConnected) and an entirely new format has been added for the dates.
Mark has a blog post about translating the date format here; completely separately, I wrote the below code for my own use (thanks to my friends who helped me with the format):
sub parseDate128 {
my $date = $_[0];
my @months = ("Jan","Feb","Mar","Apr","May","Jun","Jul", "Aug","Sep","Oct","Nov","Dec");
my @days = ("Sun","Mon","Tue","Wed","Thu","Fri","Sat");
my ($yr,$mon,$dow,$dom,$hr,$min,$sec,$ms) = unpack("v*",$date);
$hr = "0".$hr if ($hr < 10);
$min = "0".$min if ($min < 10);
$sec = "0".$sec if ($sec < 10);
my $str = $days[$dow]." ".$months[$mon - 1]." ".$dom." ".$hr.":".$min.":".$sec." ".$yr; return $str;
}
Okay, so not only does this show us that, clearly, things change between versions of Windows in more than just the memory analysis arena. So, not only does the Registry contain some time stamps in 32-bit Unix time format, as well as the more expected 64-bit Windows FileTime format, but now there's this 128-bit whatever format for time stamps!
More to come...
Wednesday, August 26, 2009
Goin' commando
As a side note, I've found that over the past year or more, with the exception of PCI-specific searches, I've pretty much gone commando (i.e., sans dongle) on my exams, relying instead on specific, free tools...not because I have anything against the commercial stuff, but because the free tools fit the bill for what I needed. Does that make me a bad person?
Anyway, I think that is would be a great place to start throwing up information, discussion and links to free and open-source tools that folks are using for analyzing various files or formats. This can include general stuff (such as, does anyone have a good, free grep utility for Windows that doesn't use cygwin?)
For example, over on the ForensicFocus forums recently, there was a question regarding viewing information in MSI files. The original poster (OP) found that one of the recommended tools, InstEd, was extremely helpful for what he needed to do.
So, I'll be posting links to and comments about tools here, but I'd love to have folks send in comments or emails about tools they use that are free and/or open-source, and allow them to "go commando" on their exams. Please, no pictures! ;-)