Why does any of this matter? Once, in a DFIR consulting firm far, far away, our team was working PCI forensics investigations, and Visa was sending us monthly lists of IOCs that we had search for during every case. We'd get three lists...one of file names, one of file paths, and one of hashes. There was no correlation between the various lists, nothing like, "...a file with this name and this hash existing in this folder...". Not at all. Just three lists, without context. Not entirely helpful for us, and any hits we found could be similarly lacking in any meaning or context..."hey, yeah, we found that this folder existed on one system...", but nothing beyond that was asked for, nor required. The point is that an IOC is often more than just what we see at face value...a file has a hash, a time frame that it existed on the system (or was seen on other systems), functionality associated with the file (if it's an executable file), etc. Similarly, an IP address is more than just four dot-separated octets...there's the time frame it was associated with an endpoint, the context with respect to how it was associated with the endpoint (was it the source IP for a login...what type...or lateral movement, was it a C2 address, was it the source of an HTTP request), etc.
Symantec recently posted an article regarding a group identified as "LanceFly", and their use of the Merdoor backdoor. In the article, table 1 references different legitimate applications used in DLL sideloading to load the backdoor; while the application names are listed, there are a couple of items that might be important missing. For example, what folders were used? For each of the legitimate applications used, were they or other products from the vendor used in the environment (i.e., what is the prior prevalence)? Further, there's no mention of persistence, nor how the legitimate application is launched in order to load the Merdoor backdoor. Prior to table 1, the article states that the backdoor itself persists as a Windows service, but there's no mention of how, once the legit application and the sideloaded DLL are place on the system, how the legit app is launched.
This is something I've wondered when I've seen previous cases involving DLL sideloading...specifically, how did the threat actor decide which legitimate application to use? I've seen cases, going back to 2013, where legit apps from McAfee, Kaspersky, and Symantec were used by threat actors to sideload their malicious DLLs, but when I asked the analyst working that case if the customer used that application within their environment, most often they had no idea.
Why does this matter? If the application used is new to the environment, and the EDR tool used within the infrastructure includes the capability, then you can alert on new applications, those that have never been 'seen' in the environment. Does your organization rely on Windows Defender? Okay, so if you see a Symantec or Kaspersky application for the first time...or rather, your EDR 'sees' it...then this might be something to alert on.
Viewing indicators as composite objects, and as part of constellations, allows us to look to those indicators as something a bit more actionable than just an IP address or a file name/hash. Viewing indicators as composite objects helps add context to what we're seeing, as well as better communicate that context to others. Viewing indicators as one element in a constellation allows us to validate what we're seeing.
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