Here's a look at the updates:
bitsclient.pl - I added some filtering capabilities to this plugin, so that known-good URLs (MS, Google, Chrome, etc.) don't clutter the output with noise. There is a lot of legitimate use of BITS on a Windows system, so this log file is likely going to be full of things that aren't a concern for the analyst, and are simply noise, obscuring the signal. I'm sure I'll be updating this again as I see more things that need to be filtered out.
posh600.pl - I wanted a means for collecting PowerShell scripts from event ID 600 records in the Windows PowerShell Event Log, so I wrote this plugin. As with other plugins, this will provide pivot points into the timeline, helping to more easily elevate potentially malicious activity to the analyst, leveraging automation to facilitate analysis.
Similar to the bitsclient.pl plugin, I took steps to reduce the volume of information presented to the analyst. Specifically, I've seen on several investigations that there are a LOT of PowerShell scripts run as part of normal operations. So, while the plugin will collect all scripts, it only displays those that appear 5 or fewer times in log; that is, it shows those that appear least frequently.
Something I really like about this plugin is the use of data structures (via Perl) to manipulate the data, and how they lead to the data being presented. Anyone who's looked at the data in the Windows Powershell.evtx log file knows that for each script, there are something like 6 records, each with a lot of information that's not entirely useful to a DFIR or SOC analyst. Also, there are infrastructures that use a LOT of PowerShell for normal IT ops, so the question becomes, how do we reduce the data that the analyst needs to wade through, particularly those analysts that are less experienced? Well, the approach I took was to first collect unique instances of all of the scripts, along with the time at which they were seen. Then, the plugin only displays those that appeared 5 or fewer times in the log (this value is configurable by anyone using the plugin, just change the value of "$cap" on line 42). By displaying each script alongside the time stamp, it's easy for an analyst to quickly 'see' those scripts that were run least frequently, to 'see' what the scripts are doing, and to correlate data with other sources, validating their findings.
So far, this technique has proven effective; during a recent investigation into two disparate endpoints that exhibited similar malicious activity, we were able to correlate the PowerShell scripts with RMM access logs to validate the specific RMM tool as the means of access. By viewing the scripts listed in reverse order (soonest first) based on time stamps, we were able to not only correlate the activity against the threat actor's batch file, with the logins, but also demonstrate that, on one endpoint, the batch file did not complete. That is, several lines from the batch file, evidenced as PowerShell scripts extracted from the WEVTX log file did not appear in the data on one endpoint. This demonstrated that the attack did not complete, which is why we detected the first endpoint our telemetry, but not the second one (because it didn't succeed).
As a side note, on the first endpoint, the timeline demonstrated that the coin miner crashed not long after it was started. Interestingly enough, that's what led to the next plugin (below) being created. ;-)
For those who are interested and want to do their own testing, line 42 of the plugin (open it in Notepad++, it won't bite...) lists the value "$cap", which is set to "5". Change that value, and re-run the plugin against your events file; do this as often as you like.
I will say that I'm particularly proud/fond of this plugin because of the use of data structures; Perl "hash of hashes" to get a list of unique scripts, transitioning to a Perl "hash of arrays" to facilitate least frequency of occurrence analysis and display to the analyst. Not bad for someone who has no formal training in computer science or data structures! It reminds me the time I heard Martin Roesch, the creator of the snort IDS, talk about how he failed his CS data structures course!
nssm.pl - apparently, nssm.exe logs to the Application Event Log, which helps to identify activity and correlate Window Event Log records with EDR telemetry. Now, a review of EDR telemetry indicates that nssm.exe has legitimate usage, and is apparently included in a number of packages, so look at the output of the plugin as potential pivot points, not that it's bad just because it's there.
And, hey, I'm not the only one who finds value in Events Ripper...Dray used it recently, and I didn't even have to pay him (this time)!!
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