Why does this even matter?
Well, an understanding of the Registry can provide insight into the target (admin, malicious insider, cyber
criminal, nation-state threat actor) by what they do, what they don't do, and how they go about doing it.
The Registry can be used to control a great deal of functionality and access on endpoints, going beyond just persistence. Various keys and values within the Registry can determine what we can see or not see, what we can do or not do,
For example, let's say a threat actor enables RDP on an endpoint...this is something we see quite often. This could even be a Windows 10 or Windows 11 laptop; that is, it doesn't just have to be a server. When they enable it, do they also create a user account, add it to a group that has remote access, and then hide the new user account from the Welcome Screen? Do they enable Sticky Keys? Regardless of the various settings that they enable or disable, how do they go about doing so? Manually, or via a batch file or script of some kind?
The settings enabled or disabled, and the manner employed, can tell you something about the target. Are they prepared? Was it likely that they'd conducted some recon and developed some situational awareness of the environment, or as we see with many RaaS offerings, was it more of a "spray-and-pray" approach? If they used sc.exe (or some other means) to disable services, was that list specific and unique to the environment, or was it more of a "wish list" where many of the listed services didn't even exist on the endpoint?
Something that's been seen recently is the LogonType value being created, often as part of a batch file. This is interesting because the value itself appears to apply to Windows XP systems, but it's been seen being created on Windows 10 endpoints, as well as server variants of Windows. The order of the modifications, the timing between the modifications, and the position of the LogonType value within the list of modifications has been consistent across multiple endpoints, owned by unrelated customers. All of this, combined with the fact that the LogonType value apparently has no impact on the endpoints to which it was deployed, indicates that the "threat actor" is deploying this script of settings modifications without consideration for how "noisy" or unique it is.
Okay, so let's consider persistence mechanisms, some of which can be a bit esoteric. For example, @0gtweet shared an interesting technique on 13 Dec 2022, and John Hammond shared a video of the technique on 12 May 2023. Now, if you take a really close look at it, this really isn't a "persistence" technique, per se, in the traditional sense...because in order to activate it, the threat actor has to have access to the system, or have some other means to run the "query" command. Maybe this could be used as a chained persistence technique; that is, what "persists" is the use of the "query" command, such as in an LNK file in the user's StartUp folder, or in another autoruns/persistence location, so that the "query" command is run, which in turn, runs the command created through the technique described by @0gtweet.
So, consider this...threat actor compromises an admin account on an endpoint, and modifies the Registry so that the user accounts Startup folder is no longer the traditional "Startup" folder (i.e., "%userprofile%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"), but is something like "Temp". Then, they modify the "query" key with a value that launches their malware, or a downloader for their malware, and then drop an LNK file to run the new "query" entry in the new "Startup" location whenever that admin user logs in.
Now, here's something to think about...set this up and run it in a test environment, and see what the process lineage looks like, and try to figure out from that lineage what happened (i.e., working backwards). Pretty cool, eh?
Speaking of persistence, what about false flags? Say, the threat actor drops some "malware" on an endpoint, and adds a value to the Run key, but disables it. The SOC or DFIR analyst sees the Run key value being set and figures, "ah, gotcha!", and not knowing about other values within the Registry, doesn't understand that the value has been disabled. Just as with a military inspection, you leave something for the inspector to find so that they're satisfied and move on; in this case, the analyst may decide that they've sussed out the bad guy, delete the Run key value and referenced file, and move on...all while the threat actor's real persistence mechanism is still in place.
The point is, there's a good bit within the Registry that controls what access and capabilities the operating system and, to some extent, applications provide, and understanding that helps us understand a bit about the target we're interested in, whether they be a cyber criminal, threat actor, or malicious insider.